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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction
 
This is a discussion of the public finances of nine current and three
 
recent major A.I.D. recipients. A principal theme is that donor concern
 
with increasing public revenues, while generally warranted in the past,
 
has resulted in insufficient attention to other aspects of public finance;
 
e;g., quality of expenditure, the equity problem (equitable distribution
 
of income), efficiency of public enterprise, fiscal side-effects. In the
 
1970s, in one form or another, it is likely that these will become major
 
issues. The Study draws attention to them in a country context. In the
 
Study itself, Part I is a more developed and expanded version of the
 
material used in the Administrator's Review of Development Performance, 
1970. Part II is entirely new material. 
I. Macroeconomic Performance 
Public Revenue 
Examining the most recent data available (1965-1968) for the nine major
 
A.I.D. recipients plus Bolivia, Chile and Tunisia yields the following: 
For 1966-68, domestic revenue as a percentage of GNP varies widely, al­
though it is generally higher in countries with higher per capita incomes. 
Among the higher income countries, Brazil, Chile, Tunisia, Morocco, and 
Turkey have the highest revenues ratios (17% to 31% of GNP). The revenue
 
ratios of the poorest countries (Indonesia, India, Pakistan, and Bolivia) 
range between 6% and 15% of GIP. Only Colombia has a low ratio (9%) and 
relatively high per capita income. The largest revenue increases are 
confined to the high domestic revenue countries plus Indonesia and Korea.
 
These six countries collected as revenue over 30% of the increase in GNP
 
between 1965-66 and 1967-68. Indonesia with the lowest average reyrenue 
ratio (6.3%) has the highest marginal ratio (53%). 
Four countries failed to increase their revenue ratios during 1965-1968.
 
Ghana's marginal. revenue is negative. India, Pakistan, and Bolivia have 
marginal revenue ratios under 10%. These countries have been short on 
public (and private) resources for executing development programs. The 
apparent deterioration in their fiscal situation promises to compound an 
already basic problem. The relatively minute quantity of public resources 
which they channel into development has been and probably will continue
 
to be a serious constraint on growth.
 
Public Saving 
Comprehensive data on public saving are available for seven out of the 
12 countries. Excluding Pakistan, public saving ranges from 3.5%' to 6% 
of GNP, and accounts for 25% to 35% of national saving. Public saving 
is particularly low in Pakistan, equal to only 1.5%of GNP, Brazil 
leads in public saving (6% of GNP) but is last in private qaving (8% of 
GNP). Colombia, which taxes and spends most lightly, has top ranking 
in private saving (12%) and manages a creditable ranking tn public sav­
ing 6%) but at the expense of current account development expenditures. 
Policy Implications
 
Countries with low average and marginal revenue ratios (Bolivia, India, 
Ghana and Pakistan) need a revenue structure whose automatic response 
to growth of GNP is a more than proportional increase in taxes; e.g., 
Korea and Chile. In Pakistan, increasing GNP has brought a less than 
proportionate increase in taxes so that continuous "tinkering" has been 
necessary merely to maintain the current ratio to GNP. Although highly 
sensitive politically, this problem requires increased attention. In 
those lagging countries where the political decision has been taken, 
technical assistance for tax administration and basic tax reform are 
desirable. This need is particularly pressing to the extent that donor 
resources, e.g., sector lending, are used to compensate for shortages " 
of local revenues which theoretically could be collected given a better 
"will" and/or better management. 
The correlation between domestic revenues and public saving has not been 
strong among developing countries. Some insist that more attention be
 
devoted to the use of the additional resources resulting from increased
 
revenues. In some countries "squandering" such resources has clearly
 
been a serious issue. In this context, it is worth repeating that much
 
current expenditure has very important development effects and some of 
it is a sine qua non for any kind of development whatsoever, e.g.,
 
general administration.
 
For many countries public revenues are still relatively scarce, and the 
traditional emphasis on their increase is needed. Given the substantial 
improvement in revenue collection of the last decade, it is likely that 
an equally important issue is what is done with the resources. This in­
volves coming to grips more than hitherto with issues such as the efficiency 
of public enterprises, the maintenance of infrastructure, government staff­
ing and payroll policies. Perhaps the question of the quality of public 
expenditure should become a basic issue in the 1970s. Little development 
results when channeling resources through the public sector means exchang-­
ing one form of consumption for another.
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II. Fiscal Perspectives
 
Equitable Income Distribution
 
Donors have traditionally focused on the need to increase p~blic revenues
 
and public investment as near sine na non's for growth. Rqcently "GNP
 
has been dethroned" as new problems population, unemployment) have im­
pinged with increasing urgency. Increased awareness of the complexity
 
of the development process is forcing a focus on policy issues other
 
than resource mobilization.
 
Of primary importance is equitable participation in the fruits of develop­
ment. In Pakistan more equal distribution of income has generally been
 
seen as competitive with growth of GNP. Increase in the latter, with all
 
the concomitant change implied, was the primary articulated policy of
 
Pakistan's Government.
 
Pursuing this policy, Pakistan had respectable growth in the 1960s. How­
ever, social conflict has so increased that today equity, as concerns
 
both interpersonal income distribution and the lagging growth of the East
 
Wingis seen as a major if not the major political "problem."
 
It is not at all clear that inherent conflict between growth and equity 
as presumed by Pakistan's decision makers is necessary. Numerous public
 
expenditures can foster both growth and equity; e.g., education, birth 
control, farm to market roads, extension service. Given the numerous
 
competing uses for Pakistan's public resources there should be little
 
problem in defining public expenditures of great productivity both as
 
concerns growth and equity.
 
On the taxation side, given wise use of public resources, the net effect
 
of progressive taxation in nearly any situation could be enhanced growth
 
'rather th~n the opposite.
 
Brazil is of interest here. Brazil has substantial disparities in regional 
and personal distribution of income.. However, it has followed a policy of 
large transfers of income both from the better off to the poor and through 
regional transfers frol the wealthy to the poorest states, particularly in 
the Northeast. Through these policies Brazil has perhaps avoided Pakistan's 
deteriorating situation. At the same time growth has been rapid; e.g., in 
1968/69 Brazil grew far more rapidly than Pakistan. 
Fiscal Side Effects
 
Development practitioners have also neglected the very serious indirect
 
effects of numerous fiscal measures. As noted, through the 1960s, maximi­
zation of GNP has been the goal. As means thereto maximization of investment
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became a subsidiary objective of overwhelming importance. A wide variety
 
of investment incentives were provided such as investment tax credits,
 
and easy access to duty-free imported capital goods. In many cases the
 
resulting unduly capital intensive technology which poor countries have
 
adopted has increased dependence on foreign trade in replacing the im­
ported capital. Further, in some small degree the problem pf employment 
becomes slowly overwhelming because investment incentives have made 
capital less expensive and hence more attractive than it wopid be in a 
world of rational relative prices. The Study discusses thgs with respect 
to Colombia. The problem arises in Colombia (and elsewherp) because of
 
failure to heed a basic tax principle: Do not confuse proximate goals
 
with basic objectives. Intermediate and final goals may not be consistent.
 
Colombia is interested in growth and full employment. The means taken to
 
maximize growth were investment incentives. These maximized investments,
 
promoted growth, and had a perverse effect on employment. In accordance
 
with the principle, if output is to be maximized, then select the relevant
 
growth industries and subsidize them directly rather than their investment.
 
Colombia does directly subsidize non-traditional exports, some 12 percent
 
by value, and with good results. If one's basic goal is to maximize
 
employment, serious thought should be given to subsidizing it directly. 
If regional development is desired in Colombia and if concomitant with
 
this one wishes to maximize employment in slow growing regions, then 
clearly decreasing the cost of capital relative to labor (investment in­
centives) is ill advised. All of this is directly relevant to A.I.D.'s
 
proposed urban-regional sector loan for Colombia which may explicitly
 
support investment incentives; e.g., subsidized rates of interest in
 
slowly growing regions.
 
Fiscal side effects are also important in countries relying to a large 
degree on export taxation. In Ghana over a third of government revenues 
result from cocoa produced by numerous small holders. The tax appears to 
be very regressive with cocoa producers bearing perhaps more than three 
times their proper share of taxes as measured by their percentage contri­
-bution to GNP. Given the volatility in cocoa prices and output, this
 
revenue source itself will fluctuate excessively, making impossible the
 
steady growth in public resources which is extremely desirable from the 
growth standpoint. 
Public Sector Efficiency
 
In the Study, Turkey and India are briefly examined from the perspective
 
of public enterprise contribution to growth. In both cases the circum­
stantial evidence available suggests that public entetprise.in these two
 
countries contributes less than it might, i.e., is.far -from the feasible 
-viii­
degree of efficiency. In Turkey in 1967 the State Economic Enterprises
 
(SEE) received transfers from the central government of 17 percent of
 
taxes, or nearly 3 percent of GNP. Probably if the SEE were self­
financing and/or paid taxes more resources would be available for growth.
 
In India the rate of returns to capital invested in public enterprises
 
has consistently undershot 4 percent. Steel, engineering, Ihemicals, 
petroleum and minerals account for major public enterprisel, In most 
countries these are profitable activities. Enhancing thei4 profitability 
in India would permit greater public saving. 
Gauging the efficiency of public enterprise is a complicaj undertaking. 
Moreover, governments pursue numerous goals through developing public
 
enterprises. It would be rash indeed to evaluate that development solely
 
on a criterion of savings foregone. On the other hand, where public
 
enterprise appears inefficient, then the cost to the economy in terms 
of decreased saving, poor quality investment, and lessened growth should 
be considered explicitly. Information in effect permitting a nation to 
calculate the costs of ideological preference, dispersal of private 
political/economic power, enhanced income distribution and so on, would
 
probably lead it, in some instances, to reconsider policy with respect
 
to the public/private dichotomy, or to greater pressure toward more
 
efficient public sector performance.
 
In the coming decade this problem should continue to receive substantial 
attention. If for no other-reason, modern public sectors are now larger
 
than some years ago, and the question of their efficient operation is
 
more important.
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RECENT FISCAL PERFORMANCE AND PERSPECTIVES
 
MAJOR RECIPIENTS-OF A.I.D.
 
Introduction
 
The following studies development aspects of public finance. The
 
rationale for the study lies with public finance as the major tool of
 
governments for inducing 'growth. Donor interest in this tool is clear.
 
In part, foreign aid substitutes for domestic resources. Hence, more
 
adequate public finan&e reduces the need for aid, and elimination of
 
the need for aid is seen as the end-goal of the aid process.
 
The orientation is the country and to lesser extent other reports of
 
the IMF, World Bank and AID. This material emphasizes public resource
 
mobilization, with less importance ascribed to effective use of resources.
 
Even less attention is given to fiscal "side-effects." Fiscal activity
 
cannot be divorced from activity in the rest of the economy. Taxes and
 
subsidies, e.g., investment incentives, affect the distribution and kinds
 
of production. Expenditures are perforce directed to one sector or another
 
be it agriculture, education or diplomacy. Donors have hitherto given
 
short shrift to these problems in dealing with public finance per se,
 
although they have come in for some attention in sector programming.
 
However, the overwhelming interest in resource mobilization-characteristic
 
of the 1960's, is giving way. Developing countries have increased their
 
* -2­
taxes to GNP ratios very substantially. Of course blissful "self­
/
sustaining growth" has rarely been the consequence. Thip fact combined
 
with thinking, better data, and more experience, as well ap, changes
 
elsewhere in development theory, e.g., the problem of employment, and the
 
"dethroning of GNP," will probably fuel a striking out, inc,'new directions" 
of public finance. The Study aims to aid this by discuspipg some of the 
likely new directions. 
Part I is a macroeconomic analysis of recent fiscal performance in twelve
 
countries. It also includes policy recommendations. Part I, Fiscal 
Perspectives, discusses possible major issues for the 1970's. A statis­
tical appendix for each AID recipient concludes the Study. In Part II
 
the approach is electic since neither time, nor data permitted a more
 
comprehensive survey. It seeks to discuss important problems of the re­
are

cipients, which/conmon to a large number of developing countries; e.g., 
income disparity in PakistaN state enterprise"in Turkey. In most donor
 
documents a major focus is financing the imnediate budget.. Analysis
 
commonly deals with means of covering the deficit; e.g., increase taxes,
 
bank borrowing. I ignore this issue as one already fully attended.to.
 
I_/ For 27 developing countries selected on the basis of data availability,
 
the arithmetic average income elasticity of total taxes was 1.4 for
 
1953-55 through 1966-68. An average weighted by population would have 
been far higher (India's elasticity is 2.4). Rajah Challiah, Trends
 
in Taxation in Developing Countriess (mimeo), IDF, October, 1970,
 
p. 10. 
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Part I.Macroeconomic Performance
 
The following compares recent fiscal and savings performance of major
 
nine
 
AID recipients,/current and three recent, (Chile, Bolivia anq Tunisia).
 
In Table 1, the ratio of domestic revenues to GNP, 1966-196§, has a.
 
five-fold range, from 6.3 percent for Indonesia to 31.4 percent for
 
1/ 
Brazil):/ Marginal performance is more varied. The marginal domestic
 
revenue rate varied from Ghana's negative 39 to Indonesia 53 percent.
 
Brazil, Chile, Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey all had above average ratios
 
of domestic revenues to GNP. Each of these countries had marginal domestic
 
revenues very high relative to both their bwn average rates and to the
 
-marginal rates of other countries. 'In other words, in the sample those
 
countries which already had the outstanding "track record" on public
 
resource mobilization continued to draw away from other countries because
 
high
 
of/marginal rates. From the normative perspective, note that these
 
countries had relatively high GNP per capita implying greater monetization
 
and greater surplus above the subsistence level. Hence, they have a far
 
\larger tax base than the poorer countries. Under such circumstances, a
 
given tax-GNP ratio implies less effort t~an achievement of the same ratio
 
!/Brazil data for 1968 only.
 
Domestic revenues usually exceed taxes by a small amount. In addition to
 
taxes, they include items such as profits of public enterprise transferred
 
to the government, revenues from sale of assets (forests, buildings).
 
Interest and loans paid to the government, rent on government owned housing.
 
Most of the literature concerned with government revenue mobilization has
 
focused on "tax effort" or "tax burden", rather than domestic revenues which
 
appear'to be a more appropriate variable. In cases where the two concepts
 
widely deviate, this focus can be'very misleading. In Chile domestic revenues
 
exceed taxes by about one half. Moreover, in'recent years domestic revenues
 
have increased considerably more iapidly than GNP.-while the tax to GNP
 
ratio has decreased. In other words, Chile's marginal tax rate is low,
 
while its marginal domestic revenue is very high.
 
Table -. 1 
- EVIIUS AND! MFl)0TDITUI R',TZOS (10,65-1968) : 
1() 
1966-1968 
(3) (4) 
muarginal 
(5) 
current 
(6) 
total 
(7) 
don. r-8 
GETP 
graoh 
I GITP per 
capit2 
dom. revs 
to C-P 
doma. rev. 
to Go 
expen, 
-toG° 
ezgnd. 
to 
* to t-d.zl 
c:zn&!. 
Korea .no 1 .173 9 .130 9 .321 5 .067 9-10 .174 8 .741 7 
Turkey 
Morocco 
.072 
x65 
2 
3 
333 
191. 
2 
7 
.174 
.187 
5 
4 
.306 
.353 
6 
-4 
.09. 
.146 
8 
4 
.200 6 
.2,6 
.869 
.792 
2 
6 
Pakistan .065 3-4 117 10 .133 8 .056 i0 .067 9-10 .185 7 .718 9 
Brazil .057 5 320 3 .31L/ 1 na .19.-/2 -32W 2 .G 3 
Bolivla .049 6 176 8 .108 10 .09T 8 .097 7 .168 I0 .643 a. 
Colombia .047 7 287 4 .09!. 11 .191 7 .047 12 .109 11 - .837 4 
India .46 8 83 12 .153 6 .068 9 .108 6 .206 5 t.739 8 
Chile .03i 9 6o 1 .247 2 .409 3 .156 3 .22 3 .910 1 
-Indonesia .030 10 94 i .063 12 .533 1 .060 11 .097 12 .645 1 
Tunia~i .01,11 22o 6 .240 3 .458 2 .193 1. .33. 1 .717 10 
*Ghana .010 12 242 5 .137 7 -.386 11 .115 5 .169 9 .815 5 
Sources: AID Country Dati Sheets, Central and Conoolidated Governnnt Finances., AID Form 1074 subnissfons,hIBRDCountry Reporbs 
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Table -1 Notes 
_/ Definitions of Column Headings: 
(1) Compound average rate of growth of GITP for average of 1965-1966 against average of 1967-­
1968. 
(2) i,? per capita, in 1968 dollars, average of 1966 through 1968.
 
Thd definition of
(3) The ratio of domestic revenue to GNP, average oft196 6 through 1968. 
, . 
domestic revenues is that of AID Form 1074. 
(4) ltrginal domestic revenues: the Increment in domestic revenues (average of 1967-1968 
minus average of 1965-1966) divided by the increment in GITP (average of 1967-1968 minus 
average of 1965-1966). 
(5) The ratio of central (general) government current expenditures less defense expenditures 
to GNP, average of 1966 through 1968. Ex-penditure definitions are those of AID Form 1074. 
(6) 	 The ratio of total expenditure to GNP, average of 1966 through 1968. Expenditure 
defintions are those of AID Form 1074. 
(7) The ratio of domestic revenues to total expenditure. Definitions of domestic revenue and 
total expenditure are those of AID Form 1074. 
The fiscal data are foV consolidated putlic sectors in India, Pakistan, Brazil, Korea and Turkey.
 
The remaining countries include primarily central government accounts. In these countries local
 
and provincial self-generated revenues are minute relative to the central government, so that the 
Social insurance accounts are excluded for all countries. Government
resulting bias is small. 

enterprises are included net of their operating expenditures/receipts. " 
-
g/ 	 1968 
. .. . . . . . . ... 
. ..... . ..... . . . . . . 
. 
'%

. . .	 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
" 
* - *•'2O . O' -j. I. S.. 
6 
TABI .2 
TEN? COUNTRISS, SAVEhGS RATIOS* 1966-1968 .. 
(1) (2) . (3) (4) (5) (6) 
p private national national public swvtngsublic foreign 
savings sz-Vings finencing savings savinga to ptJtolc 
-to GP to GT to GIIP to GP to fnvest invect-Snt 
Korea 41d .090 4 .095 .2 .131 41 .581 8 .801 2 
Turkey na na .61/ 8-9 . na na na 
Morocco .635 6 .092 3 .017 7 .127 5 -.886 3 .415 5 
Pakistan .015 7 11 .87 6 .06 3 .i0 9 .688 7 .i85 7 
* Brazil ',059 1 077 7 ;912 8-9 .136 3 - .. 922 2 .733 3. 
.Coo-b,V .o48 3 .119 1 .030 4-5. .- 67 2 .852 4-5 1.27 1 
India " ns,/" na3/ .03 4-5.. .3i 8 .789 6 na5,/ 
Chile/ .o6 2 .n6 2 .011 io .172 ± -939 .1 .727 4 
Tunisia .037 5 .089 5 .. 119 1 .126 "520 9 .209 6 
G.hna n Za.. .21 6- .119 7 .852 4-5 n, 
0-• 
'Sources : AID Country Data Shoets; Central and Consolid.ted Govaox.na Finznces, AID Foam 1074 ctemisaion.,CFS submissions, IMfD Country Reports 
.......... • ,
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Table -2 Notes 
[/ Definitions of Column Headings:
 
(1) The ratio of gross public savings to GNP, average of 1966 through 1968. 
(2) The ratio of private savings to GNP, average of 1966 through 1968. 
(3) The ratio of foreign financing (balance of payments, current account deficit including 
-net factor payments) to GNP, average of 1966 through 1968. 
(.) The ratio of gross national savings to G2, average of 1966 through 1968. 
(5).The ratio of gross national savings to gross investment, average of 1966 through 196S.
 (6) The ratio of public savings to public investment, average of 1966 through 1968.
 
,2.('1966-1967 average.
 
./ 1966-1967 average. 
I According to IBRD World Tables, all national saving took place in the Private sector. Tn3 CFS 
" for FY 1971 asserts that breakdowm between private and public sector savings is not available. 
"1965-1966 average. 
* Vm 
* S . 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 3 
DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES, 
(1) 
1966-1968 (2) AVERAGE, BY DOMESTIC (3) AND FOREIGN (4) SOURCE (5) (6) 
current gross nat'l (1)-V(2) fdreign capital 
expenditure savings Lewis to 
-defense to GNP to GNP Indicator GNP (3)+(4) (4)/(5) 
,Korea .067 9-10 .131 5 .198 9 .095 .293 .324 
-Turkey -/ .091 7 .150 3 .241 5 .012 .253 .047 
Morocco .146 ) 4 .127 6 .273 4 .017 .290 .059 
P&kistan .067 9-10 .101 10 .168 10 .46 .214 .215 
Brazil .191 2 .136 4 .327 2 .012 .339 .035 
Bolivia 3/ .097 8 .069 11' .166 11 
Colombia / .047 11' .167 2 .214 8 .030 .244 .123 
India .i08 6 .112 9 .220 7 .030 .'250 .120 
Chile 3/ .156 3 .172 1 .328 1 .011 .339 .032 
Tunisia .193 1 .126 7 .319 3 .119 .438 .272 
Ghana .115 5 .119 8 .234 6 .021 .255 082 
2_/1965-67 average
 
41968 
3/1965-66 average

_/1966--67 average Source: Same bs Table,'2, plus U.N. Ydarbook'of Natdonal
 
Accounts Statistics, 1968.
 
-.9
 
by a poor country.1/-

Good performance can also be interpreted as a low or average ratio of
 
domestic revenues to GNP but increasing because of relatively high
 
marginal revenue collections. Indonesia and Korea fall u~pquivocally
 
into'this category with marginal rates of 53 and 32 percent respectively.
 
Colombia is less so. Although its marginal rate is double its average
 
iate, its rank by marginal rate is seventh among eleven countries.
 
(See Table i.)
 
In'the sample, Bolivia, India, Ghana and Pakistan have low average ratios
 
and even lower marginal ratios. All four of these countries have been
 
short on public resources for executing development programs. This
 
apparent deterioration in their fiscal situation promises to compound
 
an already basic problem. It is obvious that the traditional exhortations
 
and prescriptions to raise taxes, be it through tax reform and/or improved
 
administration, are very much in order for them and perhaps for the
 
previous group with low ratios but higher marginal rates. With respect to
 
the low average revenue, low marginal revenue group it is probably warranted
 
to assert that the relative minute quantity of public resources being
 
channeled into developtent has been and will continue to be a serious long
 
run constraint on growth. In'these countries improved tax administration
 
probably will not suffice. Tax reform will be necessary.
 
Concretely, this problem translates Into developing a revenue structure
 
l/See Lotz and Morss. 6Measuring 'Tax Effort' in Developing Countries,"
 
fl4F Staff Papers, VolumnXV, (1967), pp. 478-99.
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highly responsive to growth. In many countries this is the case; 
e.g., in the U.S.A. with its heavy reliance on progressive income 
taxes increasing national income brings more than a proportional increase 
in GNP. In many others, e.g., Pakistan, this elasticity 4 less than 
one. Increased national income brings less than a.proporonate increase 
in taxes, so that continued "tinkering", such as changes P rates and 
enforcement procedures are netessary merely to maintain thP current ratio. 
This is not the place to discuss which taxes should be developed or 
increased in such an effort. Nevertheless, the unimportance of local 
and provincial taxation suggests that more concern with them is warranted. 
On grounds of equity and efficiency a shift to local tax sources may be 
desirable. The lack of visible links between tax payment and expenditures 
at the local level probably reduces the conscientiousness of both officials 
and citizenry with unfortunate consequences on revenue collections and 
the usefulness of experditures. AID's revenue improvement teams typically 
consist of IRS personnel who generally specialize ih central government 
taxation, so that this trend to tax centralization receives additional 
impetus. This may not be optimal. 
Clearly, the traditionkl concern with increased public resource mobilization i 
V should persist. Effective technical assistance for tax administration an4 
and even tax reform is very desirable. This need is particularly pressing 
, -where AID resources, in a sense, substitute for local resources - as in 
*@ sector/program lending - which theoretically could be locally gnerated 
- ll ­
given a better "will" and better management. A few of the countries
 
in our sample, i.e., Brazil, Tunisia and Chile, already have domestic
 
revenue ratios larger than many developing countries. In the Lotz­
* C. 
Morss Study, (footnote page ) Switzerland, Finland and qapan had taxes 
-to GNP ratios of 21 percent or less which is'less than Brazil (30 percent),
I
 
Tunisia (24 percent) and Chile (25 percent). In these countries and in
 
others where the tax system is very elastic with respect to revenues, public
 
resource mobilization is probably not a pressing issue. However, improving
 
public resource utilization may be an important question.
 
Development requires active government participation, e.g., infrastructure,.
 
education, agricultural research and extension, which in turn requires
 
more public disbursement than in a traditional subsistence economy.
 
W. Arthur Lewis suggested that self-sustaining growth requires countries
 
to increase to about 30 percent the ratio to GDP of domestic resources 
mobilized for development, the latter being defined as gross investment 
less foreign capital-flow together with current government expenditure 
less defense expenditure and welfare transfers. Table 3 includes a 
Lewis Indicator for data-available countries of the sample. For the three 
years, 1966-1968, Brazil, Chile, and Tunisia exceeded the 30 percent
 
target. Only Korea and Pakistan collected less than 20 percent. 'Weighing
 
the countries by their population, the average value of the indicator is
 
23,percent. Adding foreign capital inflow to thd Lewis Indicator'(Column
 
(5)) for a crude mearsure of total development expenditure gives only
 
7!"Richard T. Ely Lecture, A Review of Economic Development", American
 
Economic Review, May, 1965, p. 3.
 
0i
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Pakistan a total significantly less than 25 percent. Rigorously,
 
it is difficult to ascribe meaning to the Lewis Indicator inter alia
 
because it focuses on only part of the factors entering int the growth­
process and thus can offer no information on the etfectivdess of'
 
development expenditures corresponding to the resources mqilized. In
 
.lr 
regressing the GNP growth rate on the Lewis Indicator for the 11 bountries
 
0k 
in the sample, coefficient of determination was 0.147, which reduced to
 
0.052 when corrected for degrees of freedom. The relation between Lewis 
- Indicator and growth is neither tight, nor simple. 
Table 2 indicates the minor role, macroeconomically viewed, of f(reign
 
aid donors in providing resources for development. In the tablethe
 
median ratio of gross national savings to gross national investment
 
(Column 5) is 85 percent; foreign capital (current account deficit)
 
provides the remainder. In terms of the Lewis Indicator (Table 3),
 
the median value for the nine countries shows foreign capital providing
 
12 percent of total "development resources"..?
/
 
Resource Utilization
 
Country reports of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund contain
 
super-abundant exhortations to increase revenues. Discussion of the use
 
l/Were data available, Bolivia would probably also be less than 25 percent.
 
4 /Customarily, net foreign capital inflow is measured as a percentage of gross
 
investment. Logic suggests a comparison using net domestic investment,
 
which considerably increases foreign capital's contribution.' In a recent
 
World Bank Study, 40 percent of Colombia's gross investment was ascribed
 
to capital depreciation; Applying the same percentage increases foreign
 
capital's share of Colombia's investment from 15 (gross) to 25 (net)
 
percent.
 
of such revenues is less frequent. Good revenuerperforman6e can be
 
nullified by using increased resources for non-development~purpopes
 
e.g., wars, personal enrichment, employing large numbers of unemployables,
 
and ill-considered investments in the symbols of progress., Countries with
 
a low domestic revenue to GNP ratio could compensate by using their
 
resources with supier effectiveness. Hence, there is likelihood of
 
different rankings of effort from those which evolve on considering public
 
resource mobilization. Efforts to devise a comprehensive measure of
 
effectiveness of public expenditures have been unsuccessful. On a cross­
country basis, little is known about comparative efficiency of public
 
expenditure.
 
Partial measures hTve developed. Among the most common is the ratio of
 
gross public savings to GNP. The indicator misleads since it ignores
 
the quality of the associated investment. More importantly, it almost
 
implies that current expenditures are non-developmental; e.g., education,
 
agricultural extension, family planning. However, to the extent that public
 
saving is taken seriously as a measure of fiscal performance (and many
 
- people do) it can illustrate the point-about poor resource mobilization 
being compensated by good resource utilization and vice versa. Listed 
below are the rankings of the seven countries with data on gross public 
savings (1 = highest ratio): 
iy 
- -
VI 
1 
rank, public savings/GNP rank, domestic revenues/GNP 
Brazil 1 
Chile 2 2 
'Colombia 3 7 7 
Korea 4 6 
Tunisia 5 3 
Morocco 6 4 
Pakistan 7 
Source: Table 1.
 
The table shows some correlation between resource mobilization and
 
public savings. However, Colombia which ranks last in domestic revenue
 
•mobilization is in the top half of the public savings distribution. One
 
can contend that Colombia taxes lightly but uses what is collected effectively.
 
Similarly with Korea.
 
I 
To reiterate, focusing on public savings gives a distorted view. With a
 
I -­
high rate of public (and private)-saving and low tax burden, C62 bmbia
 
has the lowest ratio of current expenditures less defense'to GNP of the
 
entire sample. With a "medium" per capita income level this is very
 
surprising. According to the Musgrave Commission, which developed a
 
program of tax reform for Colombia, one consequence is a serious shortage
 
of primary education; so much so, that its expansion, with the reoccurring
 
expense involved,, would be among the best uses of resources, public or
 
private, open to Colombia. Such expansion obviously involves increasing
 
Colombia's tax burden.
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The poor correlation between domestic revenues and public saving suggests
 
that increasing taxation, has not been, a very successful Tode of
 
increasing domestic savings and investment (whatever effects it has
 
had on other development expenditure). This is the emphatic position
 
-
of Stanley Please, a World Bank economist:
 
The gloomy record of inadequate budget surpluses, despite
 
increased tax performance over the years, suggests that
 
those who argued for a development strategy based on
 
increased compulsory savings, underestimated and, more
 
frequently, ignored the effect that the increase in
 
taxation might.have on public consumption. In these
 
circumstances there is 'adanger that those who recommend
 
increased taxation in the interests of economic growth
 
may be looking at a mirage.
 
Even if this viewpoint is warranted, it leaves much to be desired since,
 
as noted, much current expenditure has very important developmental effects
 
and some of it is a sine qua non, for any kind of development whatsoever,
 
e.g., general administration. Some countries now divide their public
 
expenditures into developmental and other expenditures.V The division
 
is somewhat arbitrary. In a global macroeconomic sense the problem of
 
good use of public sector resources may not have a solution. On an
 
individual country basis, presumably, solutions persistently sought
 
should be forthcoming.-

In conclusion, for many countries public revenues are still relatively
 
scarce, and emphasis on their increase is needed. However, in these and
 
1/Stanley Please, "Saving Through Taxation -- Reality or Mirage?". Finance 
and Development, IV, No. 1, March, 1967. 
2/India's public accounts divide into capital arid current. Current in turn
 
divide into development and non-development. The main items of the latter
 
are -defense, interest on the public debt, police, general administration
 
.* and charges for tax collection.
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a fortiori in others, it is likely that an equally importait-issue iS
 
what .istone with the resources. Judicious use of planning; research
 
and administrative talent' requires giving this matter more attention
 
than in the past. Concretely, this would involve coming m?,re to "grips"
 
than hitherto with issues such as subsidies to producers afid consumers,
 
the price of output of public enterprise, the maintenance-f infrastructur 
government payroll and staffing policies. Little development results
 
when channeling resoiurces through the public sector merely means exchanging
 
one form of consumption for another.
 
Part II Fscel VerneQnt"ves
 
Background
 
Thought about economic development takes the form of successive
 
,approximations. fI the Sixties, maximization of GNP, widely regarded
 
as the symbol of economic growth, was probably the primary goal of
 
articulated national economic policy in most developing countries. Supporting
 
this monolithic approach, economists designed models where growth of
 
GNP was the end product, Inevitably, their engine of growth is capital
 
formation, investment. The models have grown sophisticated, But the
 
hard core notion remains that investment is the most necessary element
 
and its maximization the best way to go about promoting GNP growth.
 
In turn, this led to concern with.increasing saving. In public finance ­
among foreign aid donors at least - it caused a near obsession with 
increasing tax collections in the belief that this would lead to increased
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public saving, or at least development expenditure, generally. A good
 
(
 
deal of donor supported activity had augmentation of taxation as its
 
goal. (Since World War II, tax reform teams have visited 6ver six
 
dozen developing countries.) Probably the bulk of U.S. technical assistance
 
in public finance had and has as purpose increasing resoi ces avail­
able to the public sector of developing countries.
 
However, with more experience (new problems) and more knowledge both
 
theorizing and practice have become more complicated. To put it
 
-symbolidally,and in vivid exaggeration, GNP has been dethroned. Today
 
its single-minded pushing and pampering begins to appear excessive. In
 
the words of Robert McNamara: /
 
In.... planning the programs and measuring the progress
 
of development in seventies, we must look to more than
 
gross measures of economic growth. .Whatwe require are
 
relevant "development indicators" that go beyond the
 
measure of. growth in total output and provide practical
 
yardsticks of change in the other economic, social and
 
moral dimensions of the modernizing process. To ljmit
 
our attention to expanding.GNP....can only lead to greater
 
political, social'and economic disequilibrium.
 
It isiquite likely that in the 1970's the problems of the developing
 
countries will involve more than hitherto some of the more traditional
 
concerns of public finance.
 
Equity-Pakistan
 
Among tiese equity (IneReaee4 by income distribution) is looming. A
 
.-traditional major preoccupation among classical and neoclassical ecbnomists,
 
'/From an address to the Columbia University Conference on International
 
Economic bevelopment, New York, February 20, 1970.
 
0 'I 
lf 
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it is now a basic political issue in many developing countyies, and
 
rapidly becoming one in others. In general terms, the equ.ty problem
 
is simply the abstract economists' interpretation of what !Pome term the
 
social problem, or the demand for social justice, or an aspect of
 
Mr. McNamara's "greater political, social and economic disequilibrium."
 
It is the stuff of which weak, factious governments, class antagonism
 
and revolutions are made. Given the way humans operate, and their
 
corresponding history - pick any time or any era - the amazing thing is
 
•that "equity" has not thds far received more attention in the theory and
 
in the practice of economic development. Probably more than anything
 
else, it is this factor which has dethroned GNP.
 
This is well illustrated in the case of Pakistan, which used fiscal
 
policy to pursue economic development (growth of GNP) as the first good
 
in a considered and conscious decision. A statement in the Third Plan
 
reflects this perspective: "what is basic to Islamic Socialism is the
 
creation of equal opportunities for all rather than equal distribution
 
of wealth.' In the process social conflict has so increased that today
 
the issues of equity and regional disparity require fiscal concern as
 
extensive as growth, They are a major if not the major political
 
"problem".
 
To illustrate, the country achieved a respectable growth rate in the 1960's,
 
However, most of the benefits of economic progress went to large farmers
 
and'industrialists. Incentives and subsidies to these two groups were
 
generous and seen as inducements to increase saving and investment. Most
 
of the benefits from the modest social programs were enjoyed by the emerging
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middle class, the military, civil service, and other white,collar workers.
 
High cost public housing, medium and higher level education and urban
 
health facilities were of little 'value to the poor majority.
 
The incidence of taxation and the distribution of expenditures further con­
centrated income among the well-to-do. On the taxation &-e much of this 
was delilerate, in the belief that toleration of initial rowth in income 
'inequality would result in high levels of savings and invettment. Because 
of this policy, Pakistan has largely eskewed direct taxes.Y (In recent years 
income taxes have accounted for a slightly decreasing share of total taxes, 
namely, about one-sixth. This is far below the average for developing 
countries ) Pakistan developed a tax structure of very low revenue 
elasticity, requiring periodic &i-zab efforts to raise taxes through sub­
stantial administrative inputs and other devices: The 1969/70 ratio would 
have been 6.7 percent, given no change in rates or improvement in administration, 
compared to 8.7 percent in 1964/65.- / The static tax to GNP ratio, since 
1965, of about 9 percent, compares with the norm of other countries at a 
comparable stage of development of about 15 percent. Pakistan's heavy 
defense burden intensifies the shortage of development resources. On both 
equity and growth grounds, more progressive direct taxation, with the 
valuable side-effects of increased revenue elasticity, is probably needed. 
This state of affairs c4me about partially because Pakistan decision­
makers assumed inherent sharp conflict betwden economic growth and s9cial
 
!/In Rajah Challiah, op. cit., p. 21, income taxes accounted for 24 percent of
 
total taxes1 an average in a 50 developing country sample for 1966-68.
 
/IBUD, SA-15, Volumt I, June 26, 1970, p. 18.
 
3/This material is discussed below.
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justice. One unexpected result has been the serious socia conflict
 
which pushed the government into a fairly bold initiative in 1969.
 
However, no firm comprehensive program has'yet emerged. This is not
I' 
surprising considering how profound a policy shift is involved.
 
The argument that growth and equity were necessaril competitive, 
although professionally acceptable has always struck me as weak, 
particularly as concerns expenditure. Any public expenditure necessarily 
affects income distribution or equity. To maximize growth and eejt, 
one could execute that subset of possible expenditures which is highly
 
"1meritorious" as concerns both growth and equity. 
I presume that these
 
two-characteristics (development-productivity and income-distribution)
 
exhibit no negative cofrelation. Hence, in Pakistan whereas elsewhere
 
public resources are scarce and competing uses many, there should be no
 
great problem in defining the required subset. This would include expendi­
tures on public health, birth control, farm to market roads, provision
 
of modern inputs and technology to small farmers (extension service). 'It
 
could also include policies to maximize output which rather than subsidizing
 
capital formation (tariff-rebates, investment incentives) would subsidize
 
labor. To wit: Pakistan's educational system provides a weak base for
 
growth. With the limited endowment of natural resources the country will
 
become increasingly dependent upon the skills and other educational
 
achievements of its population.
 
On the taxation side, .there is noa -priori certainty as to the effect of
 
progressive taxation on private savings. It is not clear that there is
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a systematic trend in proportion of income saved by size ol income,
 
which is independent of the institutional framework. Even'if, in a
 
given country, proportion saved is positively correlated NYith income
 
size, the net effect of progressive taxation on total development
 
expenditure can be very positive. There may be substantial coincidence
 
in growth and equity objectives.
 
Regional Disparity-Pakistan
 
A second aspect of the social problem again with profound implications
 
for fiscal policy, is regional disparity in income. Per capita income
 
in the "West Wing" far exceeds that of the East.. After three Five-Year
 
Plans, this disparity has increased substantially. Whereas, today,
 
some refer to West Pakistan as semi-industrial with a spectacular break­
through in agricultural production, economic growth in East Pakistan has
 
so far barely exceeded, if it has not remained below, the increase in
 
population so that living standards there have virtually not improved and
 
may well have deteriorated.
 
This state of affairs can be regarded as due to the combination of -a-

West Pakistan's substantial development advantages over the East and a
 
policy of concentrating on nationwide development. At a higher stage of
 
development at ifidependence, e.g, larger markets, more skilled manpower,
 
better infrastructure, West Pakistan attracted the bulk of newcapital
 
formation. Geographical separation prevented transmission of external
 
economies from West to East Wing. The very government policies designed
 
to fostdr overall industrial growth had us a by-product, discrimination
 
against the East: Financial institutions located in the West aiding
 
0-!lilton Friedman, "Consumption Function
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Western enterprises; credit policies favored the well established large
 
enterprises of the West Tariff protection mainly aided Western industry.
 
Since 1969, however, regional disparity has come to the foreground and
 
now dominates the politicalscene. Whereas, in the one cqpuntry approach,
 
regional statistics did not exist, currently some such d ta are available.
 
Limited regional fiscal incentives have been introduced o directprivate
 
investment into the backward areas of Pakistan. Thus far, their main
 
effect has been some decentralization around the major cities of West
 
Pakistan. During the Third Five Year Plan, 1965-70, there were substantial
 
shortfalls in public development outlays. Nevertheless, while in West
 
Pakistan they very nearly stagnated, they almost doubled in the East Wing.
 
The "social problem" of disparate interpersonal and inter­
be 
regional income distribution promises to/very pressing in Pakistan in 
the years ahead. A likely consequence of this recent and urgent concern 
with equity is considerably increased ublic sector expenditure, e.g., 
for Pakistan fiscal year 1970/71 (coincident with U.S. FY 1971) proposed 
expenditures are to be some 20 percent higher than in 1969/70. Given 
such ambitious expenditure levels, and the very low level of taxati6n, 
Pakistan appears destined to a basic tax reform if these goals are to be 
met. 
Equity- Brazil
 
In Brazil the equity issue has been handled differently, and with apparently
 
different results. In retent years subsidies and transfers to consumers
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by all public entities were as follows (percentage of GDPII,967)
 
tax revenues
 
net of subsidies subsidy
 
tax and transfers to and;
 
revenues consumers transter
 
federal 9.0 6.0 3.Q
 
social security 4.6 0.4 4.2
 
autonomous entities 3.8 3.6 C 0.2
 
state 9.0 6.5 2.5
 
municipalities 0.9 0.7 0.2
 
total 27.2 17.2 10.1
 
*Hence, 37 percent of public expenditures. took the form of one o another
 
consumer transfer payment., In 1967, federal current transfers to,
 
consumers equalled 18 percent of Federal Government budgetary expenditures 
distributed as kollows (percentage distri4utio4):
 
inactive list 46.o6
 
pensions 11.69
 
family salary 20.51
 
health assistance, family allowances,
 
food, funeral assistance 00.90
 
study awards 01.07
 
grants in aid 14.24
 
public debt 12.12
 
ordinary and extraordinary subventions 03.40
 
total 100. 09 
A reasonable conclusion is that frazil's fiscal mechanism uses transfer
 
payments in significant degree to redistribute income more equitably. The
 
validity of the above statement requires inter alia that tax-collections not
 
*-!IMF, SW69/48, Table 15, April 10, 1969, p. 20. 
#Ibid., Table 50, p., 95. Social security taxes are excluded.
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be too regressive. The Fund Report pn Brazil of April 10, 1969, :states:
 
The relatively high ratio of taxes to GDP in brazil 
 I
 
focuses increased attention on the incidence of the
 
tax burden. One analysis based on a 1961-1963 survey
 
of family income and expenditures suggests thatthe
 
overall tax burden of all levels of government Is
 
progressive through the middle-income levels/ to .an income
 
level about eight times the minimum wage, but regressive
 
thereafter, declining as a percentage of income'in the
 
higher brackets. This is attributed in part to evasion
 
of the progressive income tax.
 
To reduce such evasion, the Government began an enforcement campaign in
 
-
1968. As the Fund Report'states: 4
This included an operation in which teams of up to ten
 
agents descend upon a business street, from both ends
 
and workrtoward the middle checking on whether each
 
business' books are up to date, and examining receipts,
 
the withholding of taxes, assets in evidence, the names of
 
officers and directors as possible personal income tax
 
candidates, and any obvious evidence of nontax payment or
 
fraud.
 
....search for possible additional taxpayers was carried
 
out by groups of agents in each region examining such
 
sources as car registries, social club and professional
 
association membership lists, and telephone book listings
 
of professions. Summonses to nonfilers requesting a declara­
tion of income....carried the penalty of ex officio tax
 
assessments on presumptive income in case of noncompliance.
 
Some 600,O00'summonses were dispatched and produced 160,000
 
additional income tax declarations, an increment equivalent
 
to one third the total number of personal declarations, in
 
1967.
 
Personal income tax returns increased from 12.2 percent to total federal
 
taxes in 1967 to 15.5 percent in 1968.
 
-/rbid., p. 21. 
2p., 29.
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In addition to redistribution of income through tax.collection and 
personal transfers, not to mention actual expenditures, Brazil 
redistributes substantial revenues through the State and Mnicipal 
Participation Fund. As of 1969, 12 percent of federal inccfe and excise 
taxes, forming the bulk of federal revenues, were earmarke' for equal 
division between states and the muncipalities, with at le&# one-half 
of the proceeds to be devoted to capital expenditures.2 Ip3h distribution 
among states, and to a lesser degree muncipalities varies dtrectly 
with population and inversely with per capita income. The jesult has been 
a substantial flow of unrequited resources from rich to poo states:
 
The Participation Fund provided (1968) more thai 25
 
percent of total receipts of states in the poorer areas
 
of the northeast and the Amazon basin but less than
 
10 percent of total receipts in the wealthier areas
 
in the south central-region of the country. At the
 
extremes Participation Fund transfers represented more
 
than 50 percent of total receipts of the states of
 
Maranho and Piaui in the northeast and less than.1
 
percent of total receipts of Sao Paulo and Guanabara.
 
Through the policies described above and in spite of an economically
 
desperate situation in the Northeast, perhaps Brazil has avoided Pakistan's
 
deteriorating situation. Comparison of these two countries suggests-that
 
measures to redistributp income in developing countries can increase
 
political stability. On the other hand, the presumed causality may be
 
coincidence. One clear non-coincidence emerges. In Pakistan equitable
 
income distribution was considered competitive with growth. In 1968/69,
 
Brazil has grown rapidly, far more rapidly than Pakistan. 
/
 
lIBRD, WH-195a, Volumn II, Annex 1, 12/19/69,,p. 4.
 
._/IMF, op. cit., p. 32.
 
3/With a smaller proportion of GNP originating in agriculture, it was also
 
easier for Brazil to grow,m-rz
 
-26-

At any rate, in the 1970's in a world of "rising expectati9ps" the
 
equity problem promises to command increasing attention in pany countries
 
related as it is to the very fundamental issues of the orgapization of
 
economic life and qf the distribution of both political andj economic
 
p 
power.
 
E,
 
Fiscal Incentives-Colombia 2
 
In the documents providing the principal background materi4. for this
 
study, namely, reports of the IMF, the World Bank and AID, there is marked
 
concern with both tax-collection and the disposition of public current
 
revenues.
 
In donor reports, at least, the effects of various fiscal devices such
 
as tax-forgiveness for investment and export promotion, direct and indirect
 
taxation and their effect on sectoral output and employment, receive
 
short shrift, Whatever the reasons for this situation - be it captivation
 
with saving/investment as the basic dynamic elements in the growth process,
 
lack of analysis and other information concerning incentive effects of
 
fiscal policy - it is unfortunate. There is increasifig donor realization
 
of the overwhelming importance of the institutional and legal framework in
 
which foreign trade takes place. By analogy, more concern with the fiscal
 
aspects of the general framework of domestic economic activity is in order.
 
In this context, the material in the World Bank's new report on Colombia
 
analyzing various'fiscal instruments designed to promote nontraditional
 
exports is welcomed.
 
l/The World Bank's Annual Report, 1970, states: "...growth of non-development
 
current expenditures is a worrying-aspect of the overall fiscal problem of
 
developing countries. This worry finds expression in almost every country
 
economic report of the World Bank". (p. 55)
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0 	 With coffee as the traditional major export (68 percent of total exports,
 
1967-69)', Colombia suffers the disadvantages of a mono-export economy.
 
To diversify and increase exports, there have been various fiscal incen­
tives for "minor exports" (exports other than coffee, rawhides, and
 
petroleum). In the early 1960's. a highly regressive expqzt tax was
 
removed and export incentives were offered: Firms could Ieduct 40 percent
 
of their receipts from minor exports from the taxable income of their total
 
expenditures. The scheme, unfortunately, subsidized firms according to
 
profitability. Profitable firms occasionally exported at a loss, while
 
unprofitable firms were hardly affected by the bubsidy program in their­
export decision.. Nevertheless, it -isgenerally believed that this tax
 
exemption 	mechanism was largely responsible for the substantial increase
 
of industrial exports in the mid-1960's.
 
In 1967, Colombia introduced the famous CAT's (Certificados de Abono
 
Tributario). These negotiable tax credit certificates are issued to
 
exporters in a value of 15 percent of their minor exports. Maturing a
 
*year after issue data, they amount to about a 12 percent subsidy on minor
 
exports. (They are sold at 15 - 20 percent discount.) Again, their effect
iA 
is believed substantial; e.g, minor exports increased 33 percent in 1969.,
 
Started in 1959, Plan Vallejo is still a widely used incentivemeeha4 
0 Assuming ah approved "export contract" a manufacturer can import all inputs 
for production of exportable goods, free of tariffs, and prior deposits 
and is also exempted from licensing requirements. Statistical data suggest 
that Plan Vallejo has been effective. In 1969, Plan exports, mostof which 
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are manufactures, net of their import content (see Table 1) equalled
 
7w 	 7 
million or 3a percent of total merchandise exports. Their average
 
annual growth rate for 1965-1969 was 24 percent. In more general terms,
 
while "gross" Plan Vallejo exports (tColmn (1)) have more than doubled
 
in the last five years, associated imports have not rise 1 pommensurately
 
and "net" exports have increased more rapidly.
 
Table 41
 
COLOMBIA, PLAN VALLEJO AND MERCANDISE EXPORTS 1965-1969 /
 
(thousands US dollars)
 
(i) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Plan (l)-(2) 
net 
Plan Plan Plan (2) as a total . (l)-(2) 
Vallejo Vallejo Vallejo percentage merchandise as a percent 
exports -imports exports of (1) exports of (5) 
1965 26,147 9,829 16,318 38 443,409. 4 
1966 45,906 12,055 33,851 26 438,902 8 
1967 40,786 17,012 23;774 42 431,588 6 
1968 51,954 17,742 34,212 34 507,963 7 
1969 61,478 13,653 47,825 22 . 560,855 7 
l/All data on registration basis
 
Source: 	 Columns (1) and (2), Jose Teigeiro, Promotion of Non-Traditional
 
Exports in Colombia, unpublished document, 1970; Column (5): IBRD,'
 
WH-200, Volumn II, Appendix, Table 3.4, 8/4/70.
 
These two export .incentive mechanisms can-be used to illustrate certain
 
basic notions of fiscal incentive,design. In the words of Charles McClure:1-/
 
'l/CharlesMcClure, Jr., "Colombian Tax Incentives", September, 1969, p. 2,
 
(mimeo).
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....in designing tax incentives ultimate purpos~s
 
(must) be kept firmly in mind. In particular it is
 
important that proximate goals not be confused with
 
basic objectives. Undue efforts to achieve inter­
mediate aims may prove inefficient (or even detrimental)
 
means of achieving the more fundamental objectiyes of
 
public policy, since the intermediate and final goals
 
may not always be fully consistent.
 
Here, these basic objectives would be maximization of domestic value added
 
of minor exports. The CAT, although not quite an ideal mechanism, as it
 
applies to total value of exports appears superior to Plan Vallejo. The
 
latter encourages imports'at the same time that it offers an incentive'
 
for exports. Indeed, Plan Vallejo can be regarded as part of an incentive
 
system for encouraging imports because of its "orientation of production
 
for export towards goods with high import components, and substitution of
 
1/ 
imported for domestic inputs in any given export industry."- Assuming,
 
what is likely in Colombia, namely, the possibility of economically
 
substituting domestic for imported inputs, one would assume that CAT's would
 
be the preferable policy.
 
This statement must be qualiffed. In Colombia, in the past, stringent
 
import restrictions have apparently operated to prevent firms from procuring
 
various inputs badly needed in the production process. Under such circum­
stances, to the extent that such imported inputs have no domestic substitutes,
 
Plan Vallejo could be mrte successful than the CAT mechanism in promoting
 
exports°2/
 
i/Ibid., p. 6,'Fo. 9. 
2Antonio Urdinola and Richard Mallon, "Policies to Promote Colombian Exports 
of Manufactures," paper at the Sorrento Conference of the Development 
Advisory Service of Harvard University, September, 1967. 
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A further conclusion - obvious but often ignored - is the inevitability 
of a wide variety of "side effects" of any fiscal mechanism. It is useful
 
to design tax and other incentives which operate primarilyon those
 
variables which it is desired to affect directly. However,1 an even more
 
general approach is needed. A fiscal mechanism may achiev# articulated
 
basic objectives at the cost of frustrating equally important policies
 
which have not entered into the calculus. This is the case for those
 
policies which overwhelmingly focus on the need for channeling more resources
 
into saving, while ignoring the question of the kind of investment which
 
results, as well as, the effects on distribution of income. -A very relevant
 
illustration of this problem, for Colombia and other countries, involves
 
the widespread tax and foreign trade incentives to increase investment.
 
.As unemployment becomes ever more alarming in Colombia (and elsewhere) /
 
there is increasing awareness of the unexpected negative effects of various
 
investment incentives.
 
Well wori mechanisms such as 4ccelerated depreciation allowances, investment
 
credits against tax liabilities, exemption of capital goods imports from
 
duty, all reduce the cost of using capital relative to labor. To the extent
 
that factor proportions in the production process are variable, a result of
 
such incentives is increased capital intensity of output. 'Thesemechanisms
 
do not promote full employment. In Colombia all of the fiscal incentives
 
mentioned above are currently in use: Enterprises producing for solely
 
"basic'industries" usually receive 100 percent exemption from income and
 
Up
 
:/Unemployment is currently, and promises to continue as, the "hottest"
 
issue in development economics:. The International Labor Organization is
 
scheduling a small conference in January, 1971 on the fiscal aspects of
 
unemployment. The May, 1971 World Conference of the Society for International
 
Development has taken as its theme, "Development Targets for the 70's, Jobs
 
and Justice."
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excess profits taxes. Firms can use up to 5 percent of their otherwise 
taxable income for investment in industries contributing supstantially
 
to economic development (usually defined as import substitution).
 
As an alternative, Gharles McClure suggests that CAT's should be designed

:1
 
to promote output of industries in need of development andbasic to
 
Colombia's growth:A-/
 
...
.by being tied to production instead of to profits
 
the CAT would not offer any incentive to the substitution
 
of capital for labor, as the present incentives (and direct
 
government iAvestment) are likely to do. This is particularly
 
important for a pountry such as Colombia with its high level
 
of unemployment (and concommitantly low opportunity cost of labor)
 
and deficiency of foreign exchange. It would be highly
 
undesirable to encourage substitution of scarce capital with
 
its extremely high opportunity costs for abundant labor. The
 
CAT would not do so. Moreover, it is possible to make more
 
accurate estimates of revenue losses than under the present
 
system. The CAT's would be issued in easily determinable
 
amounts, whereas, there is no way'to estimate the loss of
 
revenue resulting from the present system of exemptions.
 
In Colombia the lack of employment opportunities in many rural areas plus
 
* the oyerwhelming migration to the cities, and particularly to the largest : 
cities is a critical problem. This has led to a concern in Colombia's.
 
Government with regional development and with means to slow migration to
 
the largest cities. It.is a principal focus of a proposed Regional/Urban
 
Development Loan now being formulated and of which USAID/Colombia is expected
 
to be the foreign financier.
 
Mr, McClure's position as concerns fiscal incentives in such a program is
 
clear: Regional development tax incentives which decrease the cost of
 
0p
 
l/Iid,-p. 20. . 
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capital relative to labor, e.g., tax credits against investment in slow
 
growing regions, are ill advised. "Any tax incentives which are offered
 
should be tied to value added in the region and should take a form similar
 
to the CAT currently being used to stimulate minor exports."
 
goes one step further and suggests:/
=, 

As an alternative to giving CAT's for value added it
 
might be thought preferable to give them solelyI for
 
the labor content of regional production. This
 
arrangement would have the advantage of subsidizing the ­
use of precisely the factor whose private cost exceeds
 
its social costs, relative to capital, the private cost
 
of which may presently be below its social cost. It
 
would encourage the type of labor-intensive production'
 
appropriate to the regions in question.
 
HnE=Mael
On cursory consideration this idea has much appeal. The basic problem in
 
Colombia (and elsewhere) is unemployment. The latter is exacerbated by
 
structural rigidities, e.g., minimum wages which substantially exceed what
 
market forces would produce. Under such circumstances, "subsidizing"
 
employment can be viewed as'a shadow price maneuver making labor prices more
 
rational. The crux of the matter, again, is the question of variable versus
 
fixed proportions. In long run perspective factor proportions are probably
 
very variable and the proposal appears worth serious consideration.
 
The tendency to be undiscriminating in favoring investment is also reflected
 
in actions in the public sector. A high level of public savings (current
 
account surplus) and low current expenditure is not necessarily ideal.
 
Pakistan's ratio of current account surplus to current expenditures is very
 
*high but concomitant with this has been poor utilization of invested capacity. 
i/Ibid., p. 25.
 
/- d.,p. 26. 
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S Moreover, addition to capacity has been at the expense of operation and
 
maintenance of completed projects; e.g., irrigation and forestry have
 
suffered from a neglect of maintenance; adequate teachers have been in
 
very short supply.
 
In Pakistan's private sector the effect of tax holidays ap. rebates,
 
reinforced by the import regime has been to encourage ,ad4ions to fixed
 
capacity which particularly in West Pakistan have often proved of limited
 
usefulness when existing capacity had to be operated substantially below
 
capacity because of shortage in imported inputs.
 
Fiscal Side Effects- u.. 
Where primary exports are the major source of foreign exchange and a major
 
source of public revenue, their fiscal side-effects on growth equity and
 
employment will be very important. Nevertheless, donor reports have given
 
is
 
little attention to their optimal taxation. This/reflected in the case
 
of Ghana which is unusual in heavy taxation of its principal export cocoa,
 
accounting for about two-thirds of the value of all exports, and 10 percent
 
of GDP. Of the nine countries listed in Table. below, Ghana's average
 
bxport taxation over 1954-1963, as a percent of central government current
 
revenues, was by far the highest. In a table listing inter alia export
 
-taxes (plus marketing board surplus where applicable) as a percent of total
 
tax revenue for a single year (1962/63/64) the highest ratio of the 33
 
countries-listed was that of Uganda (41 percent) followed by Malaya
 
(25 percent). Ghana ranked eighteenth with 6 percent. 4 However, the
 
year selected for the table was that of Ghana's lowest ratio in the preceding
 
1/Discrepancy with data in Table i below, largely due to inclusion of 
marketing board deficit. For detail see source of TableS. -beow­
0 
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10 years. As noted, Ghana's average for the period, 1954-1963, was
 
38 percent. Compared with the 33 country table where the highest ratio
 
on a single year basis was tiganda's 41 percent, Ghana's 10 year average
 
appears very high indeed.
 
Table V 
EXPORT TAXES AS PERCENT OF UENTRAL GOVERNMENT CUBENT REVERE 
1954-1963 d 
1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 19591960 1962 1963 Average 
Ceylon 27 35 .28 28 28 27 26 22 19 19 25.9 
Ecuador 6 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 8 7 6.4 
El Salvador 28 30 26 29 21 16 15 14 12 13 20.4 
Ghana 44 64 44 32 43 42 42 34 18 15 .37.8 
Indonesia 7 7 3 1 1 1 3 .. .. . 3.3 
Malaya 25 29 30 24 21 29 30 22 4o 32 28.2 
Nigeria 27 21 17 16 19 17 12 10 9 -- 16.4 
, 	 Thailand 13 18 .25 24 20 19 18 18 15 13 18.3
 
Uganda 33 31 24 30 .24 25 19 12 8 11 21.7
 
, Excludes marketing board surplus or deficit.
 
Source: 	 Richard Goode, George E. Lent, P.D. Ojha, "Role of Export Taxes
 
in Developing tountries," IMF Staff Papers, November, 1966, p. 462.
 
The budget for the fiscal year'1969/70 (ends June 30) projected receipts
 
from export and other duties on cocoa and cocoa products at 37 percent of
 
total current revenues.1 Such extreme fiscal dependence is disturbing.
 
i/Derived from IW, S270/17,'Part II, 1/19/70, p. 22. Taxation is on a
 
sliding scale basis; e.g., at a price of 240 new cedis per ton, fob, the
 
export tax is 8 percent; at 520, the tax is 34 percent. . 
 
-35-
Exchange earnings from cocoa are volatile. In the 10 years ending
 
September, 1969, export receipts per ton fluctuated from a low in 1964/
 
65 to a high in 1968/69, 232 percent of the low. (See Table 6.) From
 
1966/67 to 1968/69, receipts per ton increased about three quarters. Cocoa
 
output also fluctuates substantially. All of this impliesithe large swings
 
in national income and foreign exchange receipts, charactpristic of the
 
I"mono-exporting" economy. 'Given Ghana's tax regimen, thpy react directly
 
rather than in derived fashion, on a public sector so dep ent on cocoa
 
export proceeds.
 
Table
 
GHANA, COCOA PRODUCTION AND EXPOT RECEIPTS 
1964/65 - 1968/69 
1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/691-/crop years 

Ghanian cocoa production 572 409 375 415 -334
 
(1,000 long tons)
 
export receipts, beans 137 102 120 197 186
 
(million new cedis)
 
export receipts, beans 240 249 320 474 557
 
per ton
 
(new cedis)
 
-Estimate. YTotal exports receipts, divided by total
 
production.
 
Source: IMF, op. cit., Part II, p. 9.
 
If Ghana could, in part, sterilize the tax receipts, from the current cocoa 
boom as a fiscal surplust-i would be'somewhat insulated from price swings 
- of the international cocoa market. Under such circumstances, taxation could 
be counter-cyclical and stabilizing for both producers and the economy. But 
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this is not the case. In spite of very substantial increaqe in cocoa
 
taxes since 1964/65 the country ran a current account deficit in 1968 and
 
1969. Under such circumstances4 steady growth in public -resource
 
mobilization~which is extremely desirable from the growth #andpoifit, is
 
nearly unattainable. The expected downward trend in cocoa prices for the
 
next few years suggests that even some of the-most basic rdcurrent outlays,
 
e.g., for education, health, administration will be cut"bedause of change
 
in hocoa price and/or output. To avoid this, heroic swi#phing fr6m hc6a 
to other sources of taxation would be necessary to offse-' depressed
 
cocoa market (as well as, switching back to cocoa taxation as cocoa
 
entered a mbre prosperous stage).
 
Extreme fiscal dependence on cocoa was not the case during 1962:61. In
 
1965, cocoa export duties accounted for 7 percent of current revenues, as
 
.opposed to 31 percent in 1969. (See Table ; below.) Prior to the
 
devaluation in 1967, differences between export and farm prices were in
 
part retained by the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) from which the Government
 
borrowed. Following devaluation in 1967, the Government directly taxed the
 
local currency earnings increased by the devaluation and the rising price
 
of cocoa. In this manner the Government partly compensated for the
 
dramatic tax cuts carried out after the fall of Nkrumah.
 
TableA
 
TAXES ON EXPORTS OF COCOA AS A PERCENTAGE
 
,OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CURRENT REVENUES, GHANA 1961-1969 
1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967' 1968 1969 
18 16 17 12 7 7 14 23 31 
Source: IBRD data, unpublished. 
*/Excludes other taxes on cocoa and cocoa products.
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An important question is the effect oif income distribution of the tax
 
relief of 1966 and succeeding years and the concomitant rite of cocoa
 
taxation. The latter is produced by tens of thousands of small (.and a
 
few large) holders. It is possible that today Ghana's income distribution
 
is less equitable than five years ago: Cocoa production ,pcounts for
 
about 10 percent of national income and well over 30 percent of taxation.
 
Then on a sector basis, Ghana's myriad small cocoa produITs accbunt for
 
W-r 
nearly four times their "fair" share of taxes. 
It is also noteworthy that the Government declares'its desire to increase 
cocoa production at the same tide that it is taxed so heavily.
 
Ghana's Government is aware of the undesirability of such extreme direct
 
dependence on cocoa for general fiscal revenues. Recent changes in
 
taxation move away from such dependence. But the problem will persist for
 
some time. It is likely that a similar side-effects problem faces many
 
* other countries, particularly where world demand for the exports in question
 
.,is clearly price elastic.
 
Efficiency of Public Enterprise
 
Donorp concern with tie efficient public enterprise has been substantial.
 
In the sample, two countries, Turkey and India, received detailed attention
 
on this score. Donor exhortation to the Turks to improve public enterprise
Sl 
performance appears traditional. In donor reports one finds quotes such
 
as the following:
 
Among the major factors inhibiting more rapid and more
 
*-solidly based economic advance are ....a general inclination
 
/I 
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to favor public over private sector economic activities
 
even though the State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) have
 
proven demonstrably inefficient
 
Weakness in finance, organization, accounting, management
 
and skills, a rapid turnover of personnel and political
 
interferrence in investment and price policies, nd personnel
 
administration have all been listed as major pkpblems of
 
the SEE by various government commissions.... (Q&rkish
 
law) provides that the prices of certain basic goods are
 
determined by the state and that losses so incurred be
 
reimbursed to the enterprises from the budget. Power,
 
coal, cement, iron and steel, fertilizer, copper, sulphate
 
for agricultural uses, merchandise transportg4pe considered
 
basic goods, whereas sugar and cereal prices aze controlled
 
for social reasons ....In many instances ....it wi6uld appear
 
that the basic difficulty of assuring efficiency is to be
 
found in the isolation from international competition behind
 
high protection.
 
Many (SEE) have operated at a loss and as a group the enter­
prises have not been able to finance a significant proportion
 
of their investment outlays from their own savings.
 
In the following, I restrict the discussion of how public enterprise
 
affects savings.
 
Insofar as a government restricts current expenditures and saves, investment
 
occurs. In this context, public sector enterpirse can be important. In
 
the extreme case, a country with a large public sector which in addition
 
to not paying taxes is'unable to replace depreciated plant and equipment
 
with its own resources, will have both diminished public revenues and
 
increased claims upon them. Moreover, in such a situation, although the
 
government transfer to the public enterprise is part of gross investment,
 
the transfer can be misleading. Presumably, the same enterprise subject
 
to market discipline (the possibility of bankruptcy as the result of
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inefficiency) would need no transfers from the government whatsoever,
 
meeting its needs for capital to a greater extent from self-financing,
 
and finding the rest on private market. 

-4
 
Some notion of the magnitudes involved in Turkey cn be drived by
 
-
analyzing data from a recent IMF document. In 1967, tctal financing
 
needs of the SEE were (millions of Turkish liras):
 
inventory investment 815 ' 
fixed investment 2,907 
debt repayment 1,232 
total 4,954 
Resources available:
 
short term funds (cash, short term borrowing, etc) 820
 
profits after taxes 376
 
depreciation' 918
 
tot&l 2,114 
Public resources transferred to SEE: 2,840 
state investment bank (2,o77) 
counterpart,and foreign project financing (150) 
general budget transfer (613) 
of 
Accepting the data at face value and netting out tax payments/the SEE of
 
TL 280 million le&ves net transfers of public resources to them of TL 2,560
 
1IIMF Report, SM/69/78, Part II, p. 6o. 
'A 
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million. Taxes in 1967 were TL 14,930 million. Hence, these transfers came
 
to 17 percent of taxes, and were 2.7 percent of GNP. It is tempting to
 
speculate as to the consequences of either removing pricing controls and
 
converting the SEE to private enterprises or, while assumiig public ownership
 
presume that they are fully subject to market forces and 4ee of parliamentary
 
or executive guidance. Presumably, under such circumstances tax payments
 
would increase while there need be no transfers of public resources to
 
them. In the limiting case, perhaps something like a fifth of tax revenues
 
would be "released" for reallocation - hopefully in development expenditures.
 
The effects of such metamorphosis of public enterprise on aggregate saving
 
and investment are difficult to anticipate. Unknown remain the extent of
 
self-financing, versus competition for loanable funds in the private
 
marketplace. To the extent that the former predominates, aggregate savings
 
and investment would increase. If'real interest rates respond to increased
 
demand for funds 'rom former SEE now financing investment in private markets)
 
and savings respond positively to interest rates, an increase in aggregate
 
private savings will occur. Also relevant is the disposition of government's
 
newly released resources. The SEE have a poor record on debt repayment to
 
both Central Bank (often guaranteed by the Treasury) and the publicly
 
financed State Investment Bank. Moreover, their loans are at subsidized
 
interest rates. As a public enterprise, it is usually difficult to go
 
bankrupt. All of these considerations suggest a positive effect on aggregate
 
savings. Private firms usually suffer severer penalties for poor investment
 
decisions, than their public cousins; e.g.; they pay higher interest rates,
 
typically repay debt, and can suffer bankruptcy. These factors indicate that
 
-41­
the quality of investment of the converted enterprises would improve,
 
assuming that th6y receive no more subsidization (tariffs, interest
 
rates, etc.) than the average private firm.
 
St
 
This is quite-speculative. The hard fact is that 17 percent of taxes
 
in Turkey in 1967 - in this respect a typical year - took the form of 
transfers to the public sector. It appears desirable to>.subject such
 
firms to market pressures and let the private sector in, fect finance
 
them. This would release public resources elsewhere for <4velopment
 
expenditure and suggests ipso facto that aggregate saving and investment
 
would increase. The desirability.of such an approach is reinforced, on
 
accepting the widespread assertions that on average public enterprise in
 
Turkey as currently managed and organized is very inefficient, quite
 
independent of legislated pricing policies resulting in sald of output
 
at a loss.
 
The Turkish Government does not propose radical innovations with respect to
 
the 'SEE, I-faQt the Second Plan envisages a prominent role for-the SEE
 
as generators of savings. In comparing the projected growth of various
 
kinds of public revenue, the SEE are expected to generate public revenues
 
at an annual growth rate of- 19.3 percent from 1967 through 1972, which
 
would bring them far closer to self-financing of their total investment than
 
hitherto has.been the case.
 
In India, data for recent years measuring the profitability of 28 selected
 
P/If there is, in the nature of things, a strong tendency for the community to
 
require that public enterprise sell at a loss or at average cost, the result
 
of course is fewer resources saved by such firms and diminished aggregate
 
investment. 
­
?/IBRDf, A L~---7sT< AA- q.i-s/,y 2 
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public concerns yields the following (values in billions of current
 
rupees): 
1967/68 1968/69 1969170 
gross profit-/ .504 .8o8 .972 
capital employed 20.180 24.761 29.968 
rate of return . 2.5% 3.3% 3.2% 
gross profit at presumed 
12% rate of return 2.422 2.971 3.596 
.-Excess of income over expenditure after depreciation but before tax
 
and interest on loan.
 
If we assume, based on knowledge of rates of return to capital in other
 
-
developing countries, an average returh to capital before taxes of
 
12 percent, for the two years 1967/68 - 1968/69, this would imply average
 
increased returns or "savings" of 2.041 billion rupees per.year.
 
Related to average$ GNP the increased returns would be minute, 0.61 percent.
 
However, such increased returns transferred to the states and central
 
government would have more than doubled their current account surplus,
 
namely, an increase of 114 percent.
 
In terms,of development resources foregone, then, the performance of
 
India's public sector is important. More "conventional" rates of returns
 
would permit the sector to come closer than hitherto in meeting its own
 
I/Railroads and many others not included. The IMF Report stated, -"in 1967/
 
68, the latest year for which data are available, the return on capital in
 
67 enterprises had been only 2.2 percent, and had in fact declined from
 
3.8 percent in 1963/64."' (p. 7) The IMF'does not include data on capital
 
employed, precluding the calculations in the text using IBRD data.
 
-See 	for example Harberger, Arnold C., "On Estimating the Rate of Return
 
to Capital in Colombia," 1968, manuscript.
 
*t
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financing needs. Public sector industriql activity is largely in heavy 
industry. Steel, engineering, chemicals; petroleum and mines and ­
minerals'constituted 87 percent of all public sector industrial invest­
-
ment in 1969. In most countries these are profitable acivities.
 
The need to increase returns to public capital is seen as more pressing 
on considering India's strategy for development. Public -sector invest­
ment in industry and mining has absorbed about one third of all manufacturing 
investment in recent years, and is projected at a substantial rate for 
the Fourth Plan (1969/70 - 1973/74). Moreover, the Fourth Plan projects 
well over ' third of total private saving being borrowed to finance 
public investment.2/ 
This cursory examination suggests that India could better mobilize and
 
use investment resources by putting greater emphasis on private investment
 
where presumably the average tate of return is higher. This would permit
 
substantially greater taxation per rupee invested or/and far more self­
financing of investment. The argument here implies the position that
 
public sector enterprise is somehow "doomed" to gross inefficiency. It is
 
*
 
tempting to view this in terms of certain "structural characteristics"
 
such that because of p~rvasive political forces, efficiency considerations will
 
generaloutdt _a-pa important but Vcompetitive political goals and 
inefficient public enterprise appears inevitable. However, in India,
 
even if low returns to public enterprise persist "structural characteristics" 
are probably such that the obvious alternative of emphasizing private
 
Y_/IBRD, op. cit., p. 59. 
? IB), op. cit., p. 107. 
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sector growth is simply precluded. In any case, the Fourth Plan
 
envisages a gross profit rate for public enterprise far higher than that
 
hitherto realized. The IGovernment appears serious in its desire to have
 
economy'and efficiency prevail. According to one source:
 
The Indian authorities said that in evaluating the
 
performance of public sector enterprises, the igh
 
capital costs, long gestation periods, and coml1lex
 
technologies applied to the production of relatively
 
unfamiliar items which characterized these enterprises,
 
ought not to be overlooked. Also, these ente~rises were
 
usually established on green field sites, necHbLtating the.
 
provision of residential quarters and other essential
 
amenities for employees. Nevertheless, the authorities
 
recognized that there was considerable scope for improving
 
the profitability of these enterprises. They mentioned a
 
number of measures that.were being taken or considered to
 
achieve a fuller utilization of capacity by product diversi­
fication and export promotion especially in the engineering
 
industries, dnd bringing about improvements in managerial and
 
operational tfficiency, in part, by greater delegation of
 
powers. It was recognized that the total value of inventories
 
held by public enterprises was excessive and steps were being
 
taken, therefore, to improve inventory controls.
 
The discussion has proceeded strictly from the perspective of resource
 
mobilization. ;This does violence to the facts, which are that governments
 
pursue numerous goals through developing public enterprises. It would be
 
rash indeed to evaluate that development solely on a criterion of sayings
 
foregone.
 
On the other hand, where public enterprise appears inefficient, then the
 
cost to the economy in terms of decreased saving, poor quality investment,
 
and lessened growth should be considered explicitly. Information in effect
 
permitting a nation to calculate the costs of idealogical perference,
 
dispersal of private political/economic power, enhanced income distribution
 
and so on, would probably lead/, in some -nstances, to reconsider economic
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a 	 policy with respect to the public/private dichotomy, or to greater pressure
 
toward more efficient public sector performance.
 
In the 	coming decade this problem should continue to receiv4 substantial
 
attention. If for no other reason, modern public sectors ae now;
 
larger than some years ago, so that the question of their efficient
 
operation is more important.
 
*I
 
Table Al 
BOLIVIA, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DATA AS A PERCENTAGE
 
OF GNP, 1965-1969
 
1965 1966 

domestic revenue io.64 10.97 

taxes 9.19 9.85 

income taxes 1.29 1.54 

customs 4.77 5.07 

others 3.13 3.24 

total expenditures 14.35 17.13 

* of which defense 2.45 2.21 

of which other current 9.00 9.40 

of which capital 2.90 5.52 

deficit 3.71 6.16 

foreign grants and loans (net) 3.23 4.88 

domestic borrowing (net) .48 1.28 
central bank borrowing --.- ---
o t h e r .... ... 

current account surplus -.81 -.64 

I/budget basis
 
0;
 
1967 L968Y 
11.1 10.4o 
9.88 9.19 
1.57 1.47 
4.73 3.95 
3.58 3.77 
16.77 16.60 
2.10 2.10 
Lo.o8 9.55 
4.59 4.95 
5.66 6.20 
4.oo 4.44 
1.66 1.76 
---. 
... .. 
-1.O7 -1.24 
Table A 2
 
BOLIVIA, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars)
 
GNP growth rate (%) 
GNP (Yy) 
per capita GNP 
1965 
5.6 
683 
165 
1966 
7.1 
731 
172 
1967 
3.2 
754 
174 
196a 
6 -
8qW. 
181i 
1969 
4.7% 
Y " Yt --- 48 71 121 
cumulative increase in GNP 
taxes (T) 
---
63 
48 
72 
119 
74 
240 
74 
* Tt - Tt-65 --- 9 11 11 
cumulative increases in taxes --- 9 20 31 
current account surplus (CAS) 
CASt - CASt_65 
-5.5 
---
-4.7 
.8 
-3.8 
1.7 
-10.0 
-4.5 
cumulative increases in CAS --- .8 2.5 -.2 
IJUSAID/Bolivia, Est-disticas Economicas, No 10, 1969, p.15' gives
 
5.9 percent.
 
Table A 3
 
CHILE, CENTRAL GOVERiNENT FISCAL DATA AS A PERCENTAGE
 
OF GNP, 1965-1969
 
1965 1966 1967 196; 1969-"
 
domestic revenue 22.40 24.78 23.94 25.-4 26.57
 
taxes 17.72 19.92' 18.91 i6.yf 17.95
 
incomes taxes 5.94 7.24 7.44 5. 5.05
 
customs 2.44 3.23 2.09 2.3p 2.45
 
others 9.34 9.45 9.38 9.2V- 10.45
 
total expenditures 26.92 27.26 25.14 29.9P 30.66
 
of which defense 2.13 2.32 2.10 2. 2.25
 
of which other current 16.11 16.28 15.03 15. 16.20
 
of which capital 8.68 8.66 8.01 11. 12.21
 
deficit 4.52 2.48 1.20 3.t 4.09
 
foreign grants and loans (net) 3.05 1.90 .24 1.7f 2.74
 
domestic borrowing (net) 1.47 .58 .96 2.0 1.35
 
central bank borrowing --- --- --- --- - -­
other 
current account surplus 4.16 6.17 6.81 7.64 8.12
 
ljBudget basis.
 
ATable 4 
CHILE, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars) 
1965 1966 1967 19681 1969 
GNP growth rate (M0 4.6 6.1 2.0 3.01 3.6 
GNP (Y) 5024 5328 5432 5593 5793 
per capita tGNP --- 600 6oo 6o6 625 
304 48 569 769
Yt 'Yt-65 
cumulative increase in GNP --- 3o4 712 1281 2050 
taxes (T) 890 1061 1027 939 1040 
Tt -T --- ,171 137 49 150 
cumulative increase in taxes --- '171 308 357 507 
current account suiplus (CAS) 209 329 370 427 470 
CASt - CASt-6 5 --- 120 161 218 261 
.cumulative increase in CAS, --- 120 281 499 . 760 
Table A 5
 
COLOMBIA, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DATA AS A PERCENTAGE
 
OF GNP, 1965-1969 
SJ 
1965 1966 1967 196w 1969 
domestic revenue 7.42 8.92 / 8.95 9.3y 9.18 
taxes 6.50 8.17 8.58 8.6k 7.33 
income taxes 3.50 3.17 3.46 3.67 3.65 
customs 1.13 2.63 1.34 1.99 1.89 
others 1.87 2.37 3.78 3.01 1.79 
total expenditures 9.07 10.05 10.53 12.11 10.94 
of which defense 1.68 1.65 1.41 1.7? 1.59 
of which other current 4.05 4.66 4.45 4.92 4.36 
of which capital 3.34 3.74 4.67 5.47 4.99 
deficit 1.65 1.13 1.58 2.74 1.76 
foreign grants and loans (net) .36- 1.35 1.12 2.94 --­, 
domestic borrowing (net) 1.29 -.22 .46 -.20 -
central bank borrowing --- --- --- -
other ........... . 
current account surplus 1.69 2.61 3.09 2.74 3.22 
I/ Estimate 
Table A 6
 
COLOMBIA, DATA FOR DERIVING,FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDIqATORS
 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars)
 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
GNP growth rate. (%) 3.6 5.4 4.1 5.5 6.6 
GNP (Y) 4998 5266 5483 5784 6166 
per capita GNP --- 283 286 292 301 
Yt Yt-65 --- 268 485 786 1168
 
cumulative increase in GNP --- 268 753 1539 2707
 
taxes (T) 325 430 47o 501 452
 
Tt - T6 105 176
--- y45 127
t-65 
cumulative increase in taxes --- 105 250 426 553 
current account surplus (CAB) 84 147 169 158 199 
CASt ' CASt 6 --- 63 85 74 115 
cumulative increase in CAS --- 6j . 148 222 337 
0\ 
Table A 7 
INDIA, CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT FISCAL DATA AS A PERCENTAGE
 
OF GNP, 1965-1969. 
1965 1966 *1967 1968 1969 ' 
domestic revenue 15.90 15.71 14.81 15.2 14.07
 
taxes 13.33 13.22 12.01 12.4: 11.67
 
incomes taxes ---.. ........
 
customs --
..............
 
others ---..--.-.. --­
total expenditures 22.76 21.70 '19.72 20.50 19.48
 
of which defense 4.09 3.84 3.56 3.69 3.47
 
of which other current 10.99 io.84 10.65 11.02 10.98
 
of which capital 7.69 7.02 5.51 5.79 5.03
 
deficit 6.86 5.99 4.91 5.28 5.41
 
foreign'grants (net) .28 .38 .o4 .19 .10
 
foreign borrowing 2.37 3.29 2.18 1.92 1.86
 
domestic borrowing (net) 4.61 2.32 2.69 3.17 3.45 
central bank borrowing --- --- --- --- --­
other ............... 
current account surplus .83 1.o4 .59 .51 -.38
 
11/ Fiscal year begins April 1
 
Budget basis. In 1968-69, the budget basis estimate apparently was low
 
on central government central revenues by more than 7%. This is not re­
flected in AID data sheets for consolidated central and state government
 
finances.
 
3/ Budget basis. 
Table A 8 
INDIA, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDICADORS 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars)
 
1965 1966 1967 1964 1969
 
7f 
GNP growth rate (%) -4.o 1.0 8.0 3f0 7.0
 
GNP (Y) 39800 39990 43080 443g 47230
 
per capita GNP 81 80 84 84" 87
 
yt " yt-65 --- 190 328o 4520 7430
 
cumulative increase in GNP --- 190 3470 7990 15420
 
taxes (T) 5305 5287 5174 5496 5512.
 
Tt - Tt-65  --- -18 -131 191 207
 
cumulative increase in taxes --- -18 Z-19 42 249
 
current account surplus (CAS) 330 416 254 226 -179
 
CASt - CASt-6 5 --- 86 -76 -14 -509
 
-cumulative increase in CAS --- 86 i0 -94 -603 
0\ 
SL 
S 
Table A 9 
INDONESIA, CENTRAL GObvENET FISCAl1 DATA AS A PERPENTAGE 
OF GNP, 1965-1969-i 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
 
domestic revenue 4.31 6.93 7.58 10.17
 
taxes 3.50 6.76 7.29 io.o6
 
income taxes .77 1.75 2.63 4.07
 
customs .74 3.28 2.84 3.43
 
others 1.99 1.73 1.82 2.56
 
total expenditures 3/ 9.33 10.44 9.37 14.58
 
of which defense 1.19 2.58 2.89 3.84
 
of which other current 7.46 5.77 4.68 5.45
 
of which capital .68 2.09 1.80 5.29
 
deficit 5.02 3.51 1.79 4.41
 
foreign grants and loans (net) --- 2.95 1.80 2.82
 
domestic borrowing (net) 5.02 .56 -.01 1.59
 
central bank borrowing -- ---.. ... ..
 
other ............
 
current account surplus -4.34 -1.42 .01 . .88 
ljBeginning with 1969, fiscal year starts on April 1. Prior fiscal years
 
coincide with calendar year.
 
*/budget basis.
 
3/Cutrent is defined as routine expenditbre in the AID source.
 
Table A 10
 
INDONESIA, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars)
 
1965 1966 1967 1966' 1969 
GNP growth rate (%) 1.1 2.7 1.6 6.6 3.3 
GNP (Y) 9750 10010 1l170 108o 11200 
per capita GNP 93 93 92 96 97 
Yt - Y66 16o 830 1190
 
cumulative increase in GNP 160 990 2180
 
taxes (T) 350 687 790 1127
 
T t - T66 337 440 777
 
cumulative increase in taxes 337 777 1554
 
current account surplus (CAS) -434 -144 1 99
 
CASt - CAS66  290 435 533
 
cumulative increase in CAS 290 725 1258
 
Table A 11 i j 
SOUTH KOREA, GENERAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DATA AS A PERCENTGE OF GNP 
* (in billions of current wan) 
1965 1966 1967 196a 1969
 
*domestic revenue 8.4 ll.O 13.0 14.9 15.8
 
taxes 7.2 9.2 11.2 13.4 14.4
 
incomes taxes 2.9 4.o 5.0 6.1 6.2
 
customs ---.. ....­
others 7 ---..... ...
 
total expenditures 12.1 16.5 17.1 18.7 20.2 
of which defense 3.7 3.9 4.o 4.1 4.1 
of which other current 5.1 5.7 7.0 7.4 7.6 
of which capital 3.3 6.9 6.1 7.2 8.4 
deficit 3.7 5.5 4.1 3.8 4.4 
foreign grants and loans (net) 4.7 5.8 4.4 3.6 3.7
 
domestic borrowing (net) -1.0 -0.3 -0.3 0.3 0.7 
central bank borrowing --- - --­
other ---. .--..--.... 
current account surplus -o.4 1.4 2.0 3.4 4.o 
0% 
lKorea's "General Government" includes nearly all government transactions.
 
Provincial and local governments receive most revenues as transfers from
 
the Central Government. The above includes expenditures of foreign loans
 
to finance public capital which are not included in budget data.
 
figures.
-/Budget 

0 
Table A 12
 
.SOUTH KOREA, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INICATORS
 
( values in millions of 1968 dollars) 
1965 '1966 1967 1964 1969
 
PNP growth rate (%) 7.4 13.4 '8.9 13.3' 15.5 
GNP (Y) 4096 4645 5057 5730 6620
 
per capita GNP 144 160 170 188 212
 
Yt - Y65 549 961 1634 2524 
cumulative increase in GNP 549 1510 3144 5668 
taxes (T) 295 427 566 768 953 
Tt - T6 5  132 271 473 658 
cumulative increase in taxes 132 403 876 1534 
current account surplus (CAS) -17 65 101 195 291 
CASt - CAS66  36 130 226 
cumulative increase in CAS - 82 200 412 720 
0 
0 
Table A 13
 
MOROCCO, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DATA
 
AS A PERCENTAGE OF GNP 1965-1969
 
domestic revenue 

taxes 

income taxes 

customs 

others 

total expenditures 

of which defense 

of which other current 

of which capital 

deficit 

foreign grants and loans (net) 

domestic borrowing (net) 

central bank borrowing 

other 

.current account surplus 

2/budget basis
 
1965 

15.82 

14.50 

2.89 

2.91 

8.70 

21.50 

2.59 

13.95 

4.96 

5.69 

3.67 

2.02 

-.12 

2.14 

-.72 

1966 

17.89 

16.75 

3.35 

3.62 

9.78 

22.17 

2.84 

14.86 

4.47 

4.27 

2.68 

1.60 

0 

1.60 

.20 

1967 1968 -1969V 
19.76 18.42 19.84 
17.02 16.04 17.97 
3.30 -3.51 3.51 
3.54 3.00 3.25 
lO.18 9.53 11.21 
24.49 24.14 25.98 
2.84 2.96 2.85 
14.25 14.54 14.74 
7.40 16'64 8.39 
4.73 5.72 6.14 
2.32 1.75 2.02 
2.40 3.96 4.12 
2.26 1.76 .99 
.14 2.20 3.13 
2.67 .92 2.25 
Table A 14
 
MOROCCO, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars) 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
GNP growth rate (%) 1.7 -1.8 8.2 11.7 -0.4 
GNP (Y) 2511 2465 2668 2981 2970 
per capita GNP 188 180 189 204 197 
Yt Y65 -46 157 470 459 
cumulative increase in GNP -46 ll 581 1040 
taxes (T) 364 413 454 464 534 
Tt - T6 5  49 90 100 170 
cumulative increase in taxes 49 139 230 409 
current account surplus (CAS) -18 .5 71 27 67 
CASt - CAS66  23 89 45 85 
cumulative increase in CAS 23 112 157 242 
* U 
t, 
Table A 15 
PAKISTAN, CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT FISCAL DATA AS A PERCENTAGE
 
OF GNP, 1965-19691-/
 
1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 
domestic revenue 13.44 14.o8 12.97 12.96 13.83 
taxes 8.25 9.31 8.64 8.15 8.63 
income taxes 1.39 1.77 1.32 1.21 1.21 
customs 2.24 2.05 2.06 
others 4.62 5.49 5.26 
total expenditures 19.02 22.61 17.53 19.02- 18.88 
of which defense 2.79 5.60 3.83 3.44 3.51 
of which other current 6.95 7.58 5.50 7.13 7.03 
of which capital 9.28 9.43 8.20 8.45 8.34 
deficit 5.58 8.53 4.56 6.o6 5.05 
foreign grants and loans (net) '4'47 3.96 4.11 4.69 4.56 
domestic borrowing (net) 1.11 4.58 o.46 1.37 o.48 
central bank borrowing -- - ..- -- --- - -­
other ...... .......... 
cuirent account surplus 3.70 0.89 3.64 2.38 3.29 
\I
 
i/ Fiscal Year begins July 1.
 
0 
Table A 16
 
PAKISTAN, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDIATORS
 
(values inrmillions of 1968 dollars) 
1964/65 .1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 
GNP growth rate (%) 4.0 4.6 5.8 7.8 5.0 
GNP (Y) 12078 12634 13365 14413 15130 
per capita GNP 109 113 118 121 
Yt - Y64/65 556 1287 2336 3052 
cumulative increase in GNP 556 1843 4179 7231 
taxes (t) 996 1176 1155 1175 1306 
Tt - T64/65 180 159 179 310 
cumulative increase in taxes 180 339 518 828 
current account surplus'(cAS) 447 112 486 343 498 
CASt -'CAS64/6 5  -335 39 -104 51 
cumulative increase in CAS -335 -296 -4oo -349 
Table A 17
 
TUREY, CONSOLIDATED GOVERMENT FISCAL D4TA AS A PERCENTAGE
 
OF GNP, 1965-1969 /
 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
domestic revenue 15.96 16.19 17.61 18.31 20.15 
taxes 14.11 14.59 15.68 16.6 18.47 
income taxes 4.39 4.63 5.05 5.32 5.72 
customs 1.58 1.65 1.46 1.65 1.71 
others 8.14 8.31 9.17 9.67 14 
total expenditures 18.89 19.24 20.62 20.05 21.19 
of which defense 5.31 4.74 4.94 5.13 4.23 
of which other current 8.50 9.08 9.63 8.61 10.42 
of which capital 5.08 5.42 6.05 6.31 6.54 
deficit 2.93 3.05 3.01 1.74 i.o4 
foreign grants and loans (net) 1.24 1.90 1.23 1.31 .69 
domestic borrowing (net) 1.68 1.15 1.78 .43 .35 
central bank borrowing --- ..---... ...
 
other ---.--- --- -­
current account surplus 2.14 2.37 3.04 4.57 5.50
 
\a
 
3_Fiscal years begin March-1. Includes General Budget plus Annexed Budgets.
 
. 4Budget data.
 
Table A 18
 
TURKEY, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars)
 
1965 1966 1967 1968, 1969 
GNP growth rate (%) 5 10.4 6.0 6.4 6.8 
GNP (Y) 9290' 10260 io88o 116601 12390 
per capita GNP 298 321 332 346 360 
Yt - Y65 970 1590 2310 3100 
cumulative increase in GNP 970 2560 4870 7970 
taxes (T) 1311 .1497 1706 1930 2288 
Tt - T65  186 395 619 977 
cumulative increase in taxes 186 581 1200 2177 
current account surplus (CAS) 199 243 331 530 681 
CAS - 644 132 331 482 
cumulative increase in CAS 44 176 507. 989 
--- 
Table A 19 
GHANA, CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FISCAL DATA AS A PERCENTAGE
 
OF GNP, 1965-1969
 
1965 1966 
domestic revenue 17.65 12.94 

Itaxes 
 15.75 ii.60 

income taxes 3.54 3.00 

customs 8.06 5.14 

* others 4.15 3.46-

total expenditures 23.45 15.09 

of which defense 1.60 1.43 

of which other current 12.05 10.19 

of which capital 9.80 3.47 

deficit 5.80 2.14 

foreign grants and loans (net) 1.o6 ---

domestic borrowing (net) 4.74 ---
.central bank borrowing ---
other ---
current account surplus 4.oo 1.33 
%_ Budgetbasis.
 
1967 1968 1969 
13.55 14.63 15.05 
12.38 12.56 13.81 
3.08 2.81 2.23 
5.65 6.34 8.08 
3.65 3.41 3.50 
17.4o 18.09 19.02 
2.03 2.17 1.96 
11.22 13.02 13.46 
4.15 2.90 3.60 
3.85 3.46 3.97 
.58 .95 2.82 
3.27 2.51 1.15 
--- --­
---.... 
.29 -.56 -.37 
0 
Table A 	 20 
GHANA, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars) 
1965 	 1966 1967 1968 1969 
* 	 GNP growth rate (%) 0.7 0.6 1.5 0.8 5.3 
GNP (Y) 1937 1948 1978 1994 2100, 
per capita GNP 250 245 243 238 244 
Yt Y-6 --- 11 41 57 1653, 
cumulative increase in GNP --- 11 52 109 272 
taxes (T) 342 226 245 250 290 
Tt - Tt-65  --- -116 -97 -92 -52 
cumulative increase in taxes --- -116 -L3 -305 "-357 
current account surplus .(CAS) 77 26 8 -11 -8 
*CASt - CASt_6 5 .- 51 -69 -88 -85
 
cumulative increases in CAS -51 -120 -208 -293
 
-- -
Table A 21 
TUNISIA, CENTRAL GOVERNENT FISCAL DATA AS A PERCINTAGE 
OF GNP, 1965-1969
 
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
domestic revenue 22.23, 24.32 24.11 23.34 24.29
 
taxes 19.24 22.03 21.74 20.75 22.04
 
income taxes 2.85 4.o4 3.89 3.73 4.05
 
customs 3.31 3.33 2.74 2.55 2.35
 
others 13.08 14.66 15.11 14.47 15.64
 
total expenditures 32.29 33.53 '33.80 32.85 33.70
 
of which defense 1.38 1.46 1.45 1.38 1.32
 
of which other current 16.03 18.19 19.32 20.56 20.29
 
of which capital 14.88 13.88 13.03 10.91 12.09
 
.deficit io.o6 9.21 9.69 9.47 9.41 
foreign'grants and loans, (net) 7.40 6.51 9.30 6.51 7.30
 
domestic borrowing (net) 2.67 2.10 .39 2.96 2.11 
central bank borrowing --- --- --- --- --­
other' --- --- ---
current account surplus 4.81 4.67' 3.34 1.44 2.68 
l Budget basis.
 
Table A 22 
TUNISIA, DATA FOR DERIVING FISCAL PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
 
(values in millions of 1968 dollars)
 
1965 1966 1967 196 1969
 
GNP growth rate (%) 4.4 -. 9 -. 7 7.3 6.2 
GNP (Y) 993 984 977 o48 1113 
per capita GNP 228 221 214 224 232 
-9 -16 55 120
Yt - Yt-6 5 
cumulative increase in GNP -9 -25 36: 150 
taxes (T) 191 217 212 217 245 
Tt - Tt_6 5 --- 26 21 26 54 
cumulative increase-in taxes --- 26 47 73 127 
current account surplus (CAS) 48 46 24 15 30 
CAS - CAS -2 -24 -33 -18 
t t_65 
-citmulative increase in CAS - -- -2 -26 -59 -77 
* p ,S o. .o*o. . .@_ 
Table A 23 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: 
STRUCTURE OF TOTAL TAX REVENUES, 
1953-55 (I), 1966-68 (II) (percentages) 
Other 
Taxes on Excise'& taxes Other 
Personal Poll and Inter- fiscal on in- non-
Income Corp. Property personal national Imports Exports monopoly Sales ternal class­
tax tax tax taxes. -trade taxes taxes profits taxes trans. ified 
Korea 
I 29.6 3.7 3.7 --- 14.8 14.8 --- 22.3 25.9 ...... 
II 23.0 10.7 2.6 --- 15.8 15.8 --- 19.0 28.1 .78 
Turkey 
I 24.6 3.6 8.9 --- 20.2 20.2 --- 21.6 15.5 5.7 ---
II 26.9 5,.6 8.5 --- 27.6 27.6 --- 12.0 13.8 5.4 .18 
Morocco 
I 2.8 15.5 9.8 11.0 33.8 29.7 4.1 18.8 .6.3 --- 2.0 
11...Pakistan 
1 
7.4 
-­ 1k8 
22.3l/ 
-
5.5 
7.8 
---
---
19.9 
36.4 
17.9 
---
2.0 
---
8.5 
10.9 
33.9 
14.1 
.02 
12.7 
2.5 
--­
-11 - 15.7- - 5.7 --- 24.2 --- --- 28.5 14.9 1O.9 ---
Brazil 
T -- 16. - 3.0 --- 10.2 2.3 7.9 20.4 22.6 8.4 19.0 
If. -- 12.11/ 1.7 --- 3.3 3.3 --- 28.7 35.1.4 3.5 15.3 
Bolivia 
.II 3.3 2.5 --- --- 43.3 7.0 36.3 11.3 5.8 26.0 8.o 
Colombia 
11 30.6y 8.9 --- 30.2 25.4 4.8 13.6 8.6 5.2 
India 
I 19.2 5.9 16.0 --- 25.0 18.2 6.8 20.3 9.5 4.o .o4 
IIChile 10.0 
-- 39.01/ 
9.8 
--
9.3 
5.8 
---
---
17.8 
17.0 
14.9 
-
"2.9 
--
35.7 
6.6 
13.8 
17.4 
3.5 
10.9 
.16 
3.3 
II 11.2 24.1 6.4 --- 12.2 --- --- 7.3 3W.0 4.5 .17 
Indonesia 
1 14.9 19.1 .92 .02 31.0 17.9 13.1 23.5 9.4 1.2 ---
II 5.6 16.7 4.7 --- 46.6 28.9 17.7 15.3 8.3 2.8 --­
-Table A 23 con't
 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
 
STRUCTURE OF TOTAL TAX REVENUES,
 
1953-55 W5), 1966-68(11) (percentages)
 
Other
 
Taxes on Excise & taxes Other
 
Poll and Inter- fiscal .-ontin- non-
Personal 
Income Corp. Property personal national Imports Exports monopoly S&les ternal class­
tax tax tax taxes trade taxes taxes profits taxes trans, ified 
Tunisia 4 
I 7.4 5.3 6.1 4.0 9.1 7.6 1.5 36.9 22.8 .25 8.2 
11.0 1.6 --­1.4 13.3 9.8 3.5 39.4
II 15.4 14.3 3.8 
Ghana 
--- 1.8 --­
--- 82.6 22.4 60.2I 12.1 3.5 ---
2.0 --­xI 8.6 14.6 2.7 --- 49.1 32.3 16.8 11.0 12.0 

Averages RI 
I 15.80 -8.09 6.89 5.01 28.o1 16.64 15.60 20.14 15.94 5.62 6.51 
II 12.38 13.40 5.44 1.40 25.28 18.29 11.49 19.19 18.30 5.52 4-38 
Note
 
-Personal and corporate income taxes
 
In computing the averages, the countries for which information on a particular tax share is not available
 
have been excluded. Hence the sum of averages of individual shares will not add to 100.
 
Source: Chelliah, R.J.,"Trends in Taxation in Developing Countries' 10/24/70 IMF Study, mimeograph, p. 80.
 
0 0' .0 " 0, 
Table A 24 
SEECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES. 
CHANGES IN INDIVIDUAL AND TOTAL TAX RATIOS 
.- 1953-55 and 1966-68 
Taxes on Other 
Taxes on prod, & Excise & taxes Other 
Income 
taxes 
Property 
taxes 
Poll and 
personal 
taxes 
inter-
national 
trade 
(Import) 
taxes 
(Export) 
taxes 
otherlf 
inter-
nati6nal 
trans. 
fiscal 
monopoly 
profits 
Sales 
taxes 
on in-
ternal . 
trans. 
un­
class­
ified Total 
Korea 1.8 .08 --- .89 (.89) --- 2.5 .81 1.6 .09 --- 5.2 
Turkey 1.3 .16 --- 1.5 (1.5) --- -.61 -.83 .13 .09 .05 2.4 
Morocco 3.1 -.07 -1.1 -.09 (-.01) *(-.08) 4.5 -.47 5.0 --- .21 6.5 
Pakistan .19 -.01 --- -.24 . --- --- 2.2 1.7 .36 .11 --- 2.1 
Brazil .14 -.10 --- -.92 (.41) (-1.3) 7.5 3.4 4.7 -.59 .46 7.0 
India .71 .06 --- .47 (.57) (-.l0) 4.0 2.9 1.0 .17 .02 5.3 
Chile 4.0 .88 --- 1.1 --- --- 7.0 1.0 6.0 -- -.28 12.6 
Indonesia -1.2 .20 --- 39 (.34) (.05) -.98 -.84 -.22 .07 --- -1.6 
Tunisia 4.2 -.16 -.34 1.3 (.85) (.49) 1.4 2.4 -1.3 .28 -1.3 5.5 
Ghana .24 .36 --- -8.5 (.21) (48.7) 3.0 1.5 1.6 -.07 --- -4.9 
Average 1.45 .14 -.72 -.41 (.60) (-1.61) 3.05 1.16 1.89 .62 .14 4,01 
Note 
Other refers to relatively small amounts of exchange taxes and miscellaneous duties.
 
Source: Chelliah, 2p. cit., p. 82
 
Table A 25
 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: RATIOS OF TAXES TO 
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, MARGINAL TAX RATES, AND INCOtE, 
ELASTICITIES OF TOTAL TAX REVENUE, 1953-55 and 19668 -
Ratio of Taxes to GNP Margina Tax Income Elasticity o;
 
1953-55 1966-68 Rate 2/ Total Tax Revenue
 
Korea 5.6 10.8 11.0 
 2.0
 
Turkey 14.1 14.6 1..11.7 
Morocco 10.0- 16.5 22.2 2.t 
Pakistan 6.2 8.3 9.5 1.5 
Brazil 16.8 23.8 23.9 1.4 
Colombia 10.3 '10.3 10.3 1.0 
India 6.3 11.6 15.1 2.4 
Chile 10.1 22.7 23.1 2.3 
Indonesia 7.3 5.7 5.7 ;78 
Tunisia 15.5 20.7 25.6 1.7 
Ghana 18.2 13.3 12.4 .69 
Average 10.73 14.35 15.76 1.57
 
Note
 
j Relate to total taxes excluding social security contribution4 Absolute change in taxeb divided by absolute change in GNP 
: Percentage change in taxes divided by percentage change in GNP. 
Source: Chelliah, op. cit., p.10
 
.
 
Table A 26
 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: INCOME ELASTICITY 
OF MAJOR TAXES, 1953-55 and 1966-68 
Taxes on Taxes on"
 
0 Production Inter- .1
 
Income *&Internal Import 'national All
 
Taxes Transactions Taxes Trade Taxes
 
Korea 2.0 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0 
Turkey 1.5 '.85 1.8 1.8 1.3' 
Morocco 4.1 4.3 1.0 1.0 2.2-
Pakistan 1.3 2.5 --- .83 1.5 
Brazil 1.1 1.9 2.1 .45 1.4 
India 1.7 4.1 1.8 *1.5 2.4 
Chile 2.1 3.0 --- 1.6 2.3 
Indonesia .51' .6o 1.3 1.2 .78 
Tunisia 5.1 1.3 2.4 2.9 1.7 
Ghana 1.1 11.7 1.1 .33 .69 
Average 2.05 3.23 1.70 1.37 1.63
 
Source: Chelliah, op. cit., p.174 
0 
Table A 27
 
COMPARATIVE RANKING: BASIC SMPLE, TAX TO
 
GNP RATIOS AGAINST DOMESTIC REVENUES TO
 
GNP RATZO, 1966-68
 
'Rankdiscrepancy 
Ranking -of domestic (number of ranks 
Taxes to GNP revenue to GNP (1) exceeds; (2)) 
Korea .108 8 9 -1 
Turkey .141 5 5 0 
Morocco .165 4 4 0 
Pakistan .083 ii.1 8 3 
Brazil .238 1 1 0 
Bolivia .090 10 10 0 
Colombia .103 9 11 -2 
India .116. 7 6 1 
Chile .227 2 2 0 
Indonesia .057 12 12 0 
Tunisia .207 3 3 0 
Ghana .133 6 7 -1 
Mean discrepancy 	 0.67
 
Source: 	 Challiah, R.J., "Trends in Tax&tionin Developing Countries,!'
 
IMF Study, 10/24/70, p.. 30, Table 1 above.
 
